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Abstract
This Article proposes that the Mendenhall-Royer standard, as presently interpreted, should be discarded
because it is unworkable and fails to strike the appropriate balance between the liberty interests of citizens and
the interest of the state in combatting crime. The test is unworkable because the outcomes of cases turn on
subtle factual distinctions unrelated to an individual's actual freedom to end an encounter with a police officer,
making it difficult for police officers to apply the standard in the field and adjust their conduct accordingly.
Moreover, the standard provides insufficient protection for an individual's rights by failing to consider the
purpose of the encounter.
Next, the Article will examine the cases in which the Supreme Court has used the Mendenhall-Royer test.
These cases serve as further illustrations both of the difficulty in applying the test and of the lack of guidance
the Supreme Court has provided. The Article then will explore the results of this lack of guidance by
examining the confusion lower courts are experiencing in deciding cases using the Mendenhall-Royer standard.
Finally, the Article will examine possible alternatives to the Mendenhall-Royer test. It will show that some of
these alternatives have been rejected without careful consideration, by overstating the perceived drawbacks to
such tests and placing unfounded confidence in the courts' ability to modify' the Mendenhall-Royer test to
yield appropriate results. The Article concludes that a per se rule based on the purpose for which a police
officer initiates the encounter, although rejected by courts and commentators, is necessary. Such a test
provides the appropriate balance between the liberty interest of citizens and the crime fighting interest of the
state and is justified by experience with the Mendenhall-Royer test.
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BRIGHT LINE SEIZURES: THE NEED
FOR CLARITY IN DETERMINING
WHEN FOURTH AMENDMENT
ACTIVITY BEGINS
Edwin J. Butterfoss*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, in Terry v. Ohio,1 the Supreme Court defined
a level of police conduct that, although constituting a seizure under
the fourth amendment, did not require probable cause on the part
of the police. In the course of defining this new level of police con-
duct, the Court observed that "[o]bviously, not all personal inter-
course between police officers and citizens involves 'seizures' of
persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. ' 2 This observation led to
the present framework for analyzing police conduct in which police
encounters with citizens are placed into one of three categories:
"communication between police and citizens involving no coercion
or detention and therefore without the compass of the fourth
amendment, brief 'seizures' that must be supported by reasonable
suspicion, and full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable
cause."
3
Because the issue of when a seizure occurred was not decided in
Terry,4 the precise contours of the "nonseizure" category identified
by the Court5 were left undefined. Moreover, for more than a dec-
* Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; J.D., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1980; B.S., Miami University (Ohio), 1977.
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 Id. at 19 n.16.
3 United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
4 392 U.S. at 19. The Court did not decide whether a seizure occurred when Officer
McFadden approached Terry to question him because he physically seized Terry.
5 As mentioned above, ChiefJustice Warren identified that such a category of po-
lice-citizen encounters existed. Justices White and Harlan also discussed a type of po-
lice-citizen encounter that would not constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment.
id. at 33, 34.
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ade following the Teny decision, courts focused on the intermediate
category of police conduct: brief seizures. Courts addressed the is-
sue of whether police conduct conceded to be a seizure is justified
by sufficiently important governmental interests and defined the
limits of that category of police conduct. The "nonseizure" cate-
gory of police conduct seemed virtually forgotten. Thus, courts did
not address the issue of when a citizen has been seized under the
fourth amendment.6 Finally, in two cases decided at the beginning
of this decade, 7 the Supreme Court focused on the nonseizure cate-
gory. The court defined the category in a way that permitted signifi-
cant police activity to be characterized as a nonseizure requiring no
objective justification.
In United States v. Mendenhall,8 Justice Stewart, in a plurality
opinion joined only by Justice Rehnquist, explained that the ques-
tion of whether an encounter is a brief seizure and not merely a
communication involving no coercion or detention should be an-
swered by determining whether a reasonable person would feel free
to end the encounter and walk away from the police officer.9 If so,
no seizure, and thus no fourth amendment activity, has taken place.
If not, the citizen has been seized under the fourth amendment, and
the police conduct must be tested by the reasonableness require-
ments of that amendment.
Justice Stewart's test in Mendenhall later was adopted by a ma-
jority of the Court in Florida v. Royer,10 and has been widely accepted
by state courts." State and lower federal courts have applied the
6 See Dix, "Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law," 1985
DUKE LJ. 849, 866-67 (1985); Note, "Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A
New Starting Point," 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211, 219-20 (1980).
7 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980).
8 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
9 Id. at 554. "Walk away" is appropriate terminology because the encounters in
question virtually always occur between an officer and a pedestrian. Unlike these pedes-
trian cases, the Court views virtually any encounter between a police officer and the
operator of an automobile as a seizure. The divergent treatment of these encounters is
not easily explained and is a weakness of the Mendenhall-Royer test for determining when
a seizure has occurred. But see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 556-57 ("stop-
ping or diverting an automobile in transit, with the.., opportunity for a visual inspec-
tion of ... passenger compartment, . . . is materially more intrusive than a question...
to a passing pedestrian."). Contra United States v. Adegbite, 43 Cr. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2181
(2d Cir. May 13, 1988)(plainclothes officers waving arms to flag down moving truck in
parking lot, identifying themselves, and asking for identification not a seizure).
1o 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
11 Richardson v. United States, 520 A.2d 692 (D.C. 1987); Pastor v. State, 498 So. 2d
962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Goodman v. State, 180 Ga. App. 347, 349 S.E.2d 216
(Ga. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Harlan, 301 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1981); State v. Jones, 495
So. 2d 334 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Davis, 517 A.2d 863 (N.J. 1986); State v.
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test to define a broad spectrum of police conduct involving ap-
proaching and questioning citizens as "nonseizures." This is ironic
because it is generally accepted that, in fact, citizens almost never
feel free to end an encounter initiated by a police officer and walk
away.' 2 Thus, literal application of the Mendenhall-Royer "free-to-
leave" test would result in virtually all police-citizen encounters be-
ing characterized as seizures and thereby eliminate the "non-
seizure" category of such encounters.
Nevertheless, the test has not been applied-nor was it in-
tended to be applied' 3-in such a manner. Rather, as stated above,
precisely the opposite has occurred. Application of the test has cre-
ated a broad "nonseizure" category of police-citizen encounters
that permits officers substantial leeway in approaching and ques-
tioning citizens without being required to show objective justifica-
tion for such conduct. This has been accomplished both by
constructing a highly artificial "reasonable person," who is much
more assertive in encounters with police officers than is the average
citizen, and by ignoring the subjective intentions of the officer. The
result is that fourth amendment rights of citizens are determined
through a legal fiction.' 4 In many encounters with citizens, police
conduct is not scrutinized under the fourth amendment because in
the courts' view a reasonable person would feel free to end the en-
counter and walk away. However, given the reality that citizens vir-
tually never feel free to walk away from an encounter initiated by a
police officer,' 5 most of the citizens in these "nonseizure" en-
counters do not feel free to walk away. Moreover, in a significant
number of these "nonseizure" cases, the police officers involved tes-
Thomas, 343 S.E.2d 591 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); State v. Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
12 See United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040 (D.C. 1985); Williamson, "The Dimensions of Seizure: The Con-
cepts of 'Stop' and 'Arrest'," 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 771, 801 (1982); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.2(h) at 402 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]; LaFave, "Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improba-
ble Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew)," 74 J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1185 (1983) [hereinafter, LaFave, "Fourth Amendment
Vagaries"]; MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1, comment at 258
(1975).
13 This is obvious given thatJustice Stewart, the author of the test, used it to find that
Sylvia Mendenhall was not seized when she was approached by police officers and
questioned.
14 Williamson, supra note 12, at 814 ("[T]he use of this test clearly directs the focus
of inquiry, at least in some cases, to the perception rather than the fact of a restriction on
freedom of movement."); United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983).
15 See supra note 12.
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tified that the citizen in fact was not free to leave. 16 The result is that
citizens who do not feel free to end encounters with police and who,
in fact, would not be permitted to do so, are left outside the scope of
fourth amendment protections because the reasonable person con-
structed by the courts would have felt free to leave.
Lack of judicial scrutiny of these encounters is troubling be-
cause often the purpose of the encounters is to obtain either a con-
fession or the individual's consent to a search.1 7 Many of the
encounters are successful and citizens are convicted for crimes with
evidence obtained through their "voluntary" cooperation with a po-
lice officer during an encounter that the officer had no objective rea-
son to initiate and for which the court requires no explanation.
Moreover, in many instances the facts of these "voluntary coopera-
tion nonseizure" cases resulting in convictions are strikingly similar
to those cases in which confessions or evidence gained from "con-
sent" searches are suppressed based on unlawful police conduct in
initiating the encounter.' 8
These inconsistent outcomes result in part from the artificiality
of the test applied by the courts. Because the seizure-nonseizure
decision is not based on a realistic appraisal of the individual's free-
dom to walk away, but rather on an artificial reasonable person stan-
dard,' 9 the outcomes turn on "minute factual differences" 2 0 that
courts have determined to be crucial, but which bear little relation-
ship to the individual's actual freedom to walk away. This artificial-
16 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 575 n.12 (1980); United States v.
Woods, 720 F.2d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d 145, 149 (La.
1979); State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1343 (R.I. 1986).
17 See Greenberg, "Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police In-
trusions on Less Than Probable Cause," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 75 (1981)("In [drug
cases] a limited stop based on less than probable cause is of little investigative value
without extensive subsequent intrusions."); Williamson, supra note 12, at 773-74
("[S]eizure of an individual may provide the opportunity to question the person and
obtain incriminating statements ... [and] ... other evidence ...."); Note, "Reformu-
lating Seizures-Airport Stops and the Fourth Amendment," 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1486,
1488 (1981) (The purpose of questioning by agents in airport offices or similar locations
"is to obtain permission to search the suspect's person and luggage for narcotics.")
[hereinafter, Note, "Reformulating Seizures"].
18 United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 588-89 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States
v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1981); Becton, "The Drug Courier Profile: 'All
Seems Infected That Th' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye'," 65
N.C.L. REv. 417, 454 (1987); Note, "Reformulating Seizures," supra note 17, at 1492
n.40, 1499 n.78.
19 See United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1983)(Mendenhall-Royer
test makes decision depend on "technical legal construct" rather than a factual inquiry);
United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040, 1044 n.9 (D.C. 1985)(Mendenhall-Royer test arbi-
trary, based on practical policy decision to expand options of police).
20 United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
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ity has resulted in a category of nonseizures that bears little
resemblance to encounters initiated by police for purposes "wholly
unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime" 2 1 described inJustice
Warren's opinion for the Court in Terry.
Courts have lost sight of Justice Warren's observation that
"street encounters between citizens and police officers are ircredi-
bly rich in diversity" 22 and concern themselves not with the purpose
of the encounter, but only with the effect of the officers' actions on
the reasonable person they have constructed. Courts have justified
their expansion of the nonseizure category of police-citizen en-
counters by relying on the duty of every citizen to cooperate with
police, even when the cooperation sought by the police is coopera-
tion implicating the individual herself in criminal activity.2 3 The ar-
tificiality results because the reasonable person standard masks a
policy choice concerning the value. or appropriateness of police
seeking cooperation from suspects. Utilizing the Mendenhall-Royer
"free to leave" test, courts have greatly expanded the category of
nonseizures by ignoring the fifth amendment implications of en-
counters involving an individual suspected of criminal activity.
Although the Mendenhall-Royer test has been criticized, 24 com-
mentators are surprisingly hesitant to advocate its abandonment.25
Moreover, even those in favor of replacing the test resist doing so
21 Terry, 392 U.S. at 13.
22 Id. at 13; see also United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 651, rev'd, 717 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1983) (en banc).
23 The duty of every citizen to cooperate with police offices in the detection and pre-
vention of crime has long been recognized. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court noted that
"[i]t is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they
may have in the aid of law enforcement." 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966). Similarly, in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971), the Court, in a plurality opinion,
stated that "[ilt is no part of the policy of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals."
Of course, it is part of the fifth amendment that such a duty does not include a
responsibility to aid law enforcement by confessing to one's own criminal actions. Nev-
ertheless, the duty of citizens to cooperate seems to have influenced recent decisions in
which police officers seek the cooperation of individuals not to apprehend others, but to
gain incriminating evidence against the individual himself. Moreover, the Court seems
to have changed its view of the value of evidence gained from a suspect or an accused
and has begun to place considerable value on such evidence. See Van Kessel, "The
Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and Ameri-
can Approaches," 38 H;,STINGs LJ. 1, 6 (1986).
24 See Note, "Reformulating Seizures:" supra note 17, at 1495-1502; Becton, supra
note 18, at 467-69; Greenberg, supra note 17, at 68-72; LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 12, at 411-412.
25 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 411 (suggesting appropriate way to
"interpret" Mendenhall-Royer test); Dix, supra note 6, at 867 (Mendenhall-Royer standard
might well be the only appropriate and feasible one).
1988]
ED WINJ. BUTTERFOSS
with a per se rule based upon the purpose of the officer in initiating
the encounter. 26 This Article proposes that the Mendenhall-Royer
standard, as presently interpreted, should be discarded because it is
unworkable and fails to strike the appropriate balance between the
liberty interests of citizens and the interest of the state in combat-
ting crime. The test is unworkable because the outcomes of cases
turn on subtle factual distinctions unrelated to an individual's actual
freedom to end an encounter with a police officer, making it difficult
for police officers to apply the standard in the field and adjust their
conduct accordingly. Moreover, the standard provides insufficient
protection for an individual's rights by failing to consider the pur-
pose of the encounter.
The test should be replaced by a per se rule based on the pur-
pose for which the officer initiates the encounter with the citizen. If
a police officer initiates contact with an individual to investigate that
individual for complicity in criminal activity, the officer should be
required to demonstrate an objective basis-reasonable suspicion-
for doing so. Such a standard is easily applied and strikes the
proper balance between the protection required for citizens and the
need to avoid burdening police unnecessarily. Although such a test
is unlikely to be adopted by the present Supreme Court, it is a stan-
dard that state courts should consider in analyzing encounters be-
tween police and citizens of the state.27
This Article will first examine the two cases in which the present
test was developed. 28 This examination will show that Justice Stew-
art developed the test with virtually no analysis of why it is the ap-
propriate means to determine when a citizen has been seized by a
police officer and that a majority of the Court later adopted the test
with a similar lack of analysis. Moreover, the inconsistent results in
these two cases illustrate the difficulty in applying the test. Next, the
Article will examine the cases in which the Supreme Court has used
the Mendenhall-Royer test.29 These cases serve as further illustrations
both of the difficulty in applying the test and of the lack of guidance
26 Note, "Reformulating Seizures," supra note 17, at 1502-03 (proposing a "mul-
tifactor analysis"); Becton, supra note 18, at 471-72 (proposing bright line rule for drug
courier profile stops); Greenberg, supra note 17, at 76 (proposing prophylactic rule re-
quiring warnings of right to refuse consent to search); Comment, "Fourth Amendment
Airport Searches and Seizures: Where Will the Court Land?" 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 499, 512 (1980)(proposing "hindsight" rule classifying as seizures encounters
where incriminating evidence is found).
27 Michigan v. Chesternut, 43 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 3077 (U.S. S. Ct. June 13,
1988)(refusing to adopt bright line test to determine when seizure occurs in chase
cases).
28 See infra text accompanying notes 33-85.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 86-105.
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the Supreme Court has provided. The Article then will explore the
results of this lack of guidance by examining the confusion lower
courts are experiencing in deciding cases using the Mendenhall-Royer
standard.30 Some lower courts interpret the Supreme Court deci-
sions to mean that in the absence of an explicit show of authority or
threat of force, a reasonable person feels free to walk away from an
encounter initiated by a police officer. Therefore, the person has
not been seized, regardless of the officer's reasons for initiating the
encounter. These courts narrowly apply the Mendenhall-Royer stan-
dard to create a broad category of police conduct which falls below
the level of a seizure. Other courts are less willing to accept that a
reasonable person would feel free to walk away from an encounter
with a police officer that goes much beyond a simple request to talk.
These courts find a seizure has occurred at varying points during
police-citizen encounters. These different interpretations result in
vastly different treatment of factually similar cases.
Finally, the Article will examine possible alternatives to the
Mendenhall-Royer test.3 ' It will show that some of these alternatives
have been rejected without careful consideration, by overstating the
perceived drawbacks to such tests and placing unfounded confi-
dence in the courts' ability to modify' the Mendenhall-Royer test to
yield appropriate results. The Article concludes that a per se rule
based on the purpose for which a police officer initiates the encoun-
ter, although rejected by courts and commentators, is necessary.
Such a test provides the appropriate balance between the liberty in-
terest of citizens and the crime fighting interest of the state and is
justified by experience with the Mendenhall-Royer test.
3 2
II. THE MENDENHALL-ROYER STANDARD
The present standard for determining whether a police-citizen
encounter constitutes a seizure first appeared in the lead opinion in
United States v. Mendenhall."3 In Mendenhall, defendant Sylvia Men-
denhall was observed by two Drug Enforcement Agency agents at
the Detroit Metro Airport as she disembarked from an airplane ar-
riving from Los Angeles. Because the agents believed Ms. Menden-
hall's conduct to be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying
narcotics,3 4 the agents approached her as she was walking through
30 See infra text accompanying notes 106-40.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 141-79.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 181-228.
33 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
34 The agent testified that Ms. Mendenhall's behavior fit the "drug courier profile."
Id. at 547 n.1.
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the concourse, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to
see her identification and airline ticket. Ms. Mendenhall produced a
driver's license in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall and an airline
ticket issued to "Annette Ford." Asked to explain the discrepancy,
Mendenhall stated that she "just felt like using that name." 35 In re-
sponse to a further question, Mendenhall stated she had been in
California only two days. At that point, one of the agents specifically
identified himself as a narcotics agent, and Mendenhall became
"quite shaken [and] extremely nervous." 36 The agents returned
Mendenhall's license and ticket and requested that she accompany
them to the airport DEA office for further questioning. Without
orally responding, Mendenhall followed the agents to the office.
37
Once there, Mendenhall agreed to a search of her person and her
handbag, although she was informed that she had the right to de-
cline. The subsequent search led to the discovery of heroin, and
Mendenhall was arrested.
38
Justice Stewart's lead opinion in Mendenhall focused on whether
Mendenhall had been "seized" when the agents approached her on
the concourse and asked her questions. 39 If she had, the agents
were required to provide an objective justification for their conduct.
That is, they were required to show that they reasonably suspected
Mendenhall of wrongdoing.40 Conversely, if Mendenhall was not
seized, no objective justification was required because without a
seizure there was no "foundation whatever for invoking constitu-
tional safeguards.
4 1
Justice Stewart started from the premise articulated by Justice
Warren in Terry v. Ohio that not all encounters between police and
citizens constitute seizures. Quoting the concurring opinions of
Justices White and Harlan in Terry, Justice Stewart explained that
" '[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman
from addressing questions to anyone on the street,' " and that
In this case, the agents thought it relevant that (1) the respondent was arriving on a
flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the agents to be the place of origin for
much of the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) the respondent was the last person to
leave the plane, 'appeared to be very nervous,' and 'completely scanned the whole
areas where [the agents] were standing'; (3) after leaving the plane the respondent
proceeded past the baggage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the respon-
dent changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Id. at 547 n.l.
35 Id. at 548.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 549-50.
39 Id. at 551.
40 Id. at 552.
41 Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
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"[p]olice officers enjoy 'the liberty (again, possessed by every citi-
zen) to address questions to other persons,' although 'ordinarily the
person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and
walk away.' "42 In Justice Stewart's view,43 precedent demonstrated
that only when this liberty was "in some way demonstrably cur-
tailed" was a seizure effectuated requiring objective justification.44
Thus, Justice Stewart "adhere[d] to the view [expressed in Teny]
that a person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a
show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." 45 Jus-
tice Stewart explained that no seizure occurs "[a]s long as the per-
son to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the
questions and walk away."'46 The converse of this is that when the
person is not free to disregard the questions and walk away, a
seizure has occurred. Thus, under a literal interpretation of this
definition of seizure, when an individual in fact is not free to walk
away because the officer has no intention of letting the individual
go, a seizure has occurred. 47 A single paragraph later in his Menden-
hall opinion, however, Justice Stewart offered a less inclusive defini-
tion of a seizure.48 Justice Stewart stated that "[w]e conclude that a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave."
'49
42 Id. (quoting the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Harlan
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34, 31-33 (1968)).
43 Id. at 553.
44 Id. Stewart believed this was demonstrated by Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968), a companion case to Terry. In Sibron, a police officer approached the defendant
in a restaurant, told him to come outside, and searched him when he did so. The Court
explained that, in light of the subsequent search, it was not necessary to decide whether
Sibron was seized inside the restaurant. The Court noted that the record was unclear
with respect to what occurred in the restaurant, and was "totally barren of any indication
whether Sibron accompanied [the officer] outside in submission to a show of force or
authority which left him no choice, or whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent
cooperation with the officer's investigation." Id. at 63. Although the Sibron court ex-
plained that "this deficiency in the record is immaterial" in light of the subsequent ille-
gal searchJustice Stewart felt that the quoted language demonstrated that "[p]lainly...
there was no seizure until the police officer in some way demonstrably curtailed Sibron's
liberty." Id. at 553.
45 Id. at 554.
46 The person has stopped to talk to a police officer and the officer will not let the
person leave. Thus, "his freedom of movement is restrained."
47 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 814 ("[T]he use of [the Mendenhall-Royer] test
clearly directs the focus of inquiry, at least in some cases, to the perception rather than
the fact of restriction on freedom of movement.").
48 446 U.S. at 554.
49 Id.
1988] 445
EDWIN J. BUTTERFOSS
The factors to be considered in reaching this determination in-
cluded the number of officers present, the display of a weapon,
physical contact between the officer and citizen, and the officer's
language and tone of voice. 50 On the facts of the case before the
Court, Justice Stewart concluded that no seizure had occurred. Im-
portant in the Mendenhall decision were the facts that the events took
place on a public concourse, the agents were not in uniform and did
not display weapons, and the officers did not summon the defendant
but rather approached the defendant and identified themselves as
federal agents and requested, but did not demand, to see defend-
ant's identification and airline ticket. 5 ' Justice Stewart made clear
that "[t]he respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact
that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them
her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions."
52
With a questionable citation to the ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURES 53 , Justice Stewart stated that a law enforce-
ment officer's questioning an individual is not enough to establish a
seizure.54 Justice Stewart concluded that "[imn short, nothing in the
record suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to be-
lieve that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse
and proceed on her way .... -55 The fact that the officer had testi-
fied that Mendenhall was not free to walk away did not concern Jus-
tice Stewart. He made clear in a footnote that under this definition
of seizure, the subjective intention of the officer or agent in detain-
ing a suspect is irrelevant except insofar as that may be conveyed to
the citizen. 56 Justice Stewart offered no explanation of why a focus
on the belief of a reasonable person was more appropriate than an
assessment of whether the suspect actually was free to leave. The
latter assessment seemed mandated by the earlier definition of
seizure quoted from Terry and could easily have been made in the
50 Id.
51 Id. at 555.
52 Id.
53 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1, Comment at 258 (1975).
54 Aendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. This citation by Justice Stewart is misleading because
although the Model Code section he cited (Sec. 101.1(1)) permits officers to approach
and request cooperation from citizens without effecting a seizure, it does not extend this
authority to encounters with individuals suspected of criminal activity. In that case, the
Code requires that warnings be given to the individual. Thus, Justice Stewart's citation
to Sec. 101.1 (1) to support the authority of an officer to approach and question an indi-
vidual suspected of a crime is simply wrong. He is not alone, however, in seeking sup-
port for police encounters with suspects in this section. See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 412 n.242.
55 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555.
56 Id. at 554 n.6.
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case before the Court.57
The remaining opinions in Mendenhall did not address the
seizure issue in detail. In his concurrence, Justice Powell assumed
that a seizure had taken place but thought reasonable suspicion ex-
isted tojustify it.58 He did not "necessarily disagree" with the stan-
dard set forth by Justice Stewart, but thought the question of
whether Mendenhall reasonably could have thought she was free to
"walk away" was extremely close.59 In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice White likewise assumed a seizure had occurred, but he seemed
to disagree with the standard suggested by Stewart, at least as it was
being applied in the present case.
60
The presence of three separate analyses of the police-citizen en-
counter in Mendenhall understandably led to some uncertainty
among lower courts as to what standard to use in determining if a
seizure had occurred. 61 That uncertainty was removed, however, in
Florida v. Royer.62 In Royer, a four justice plurality, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice White, adopted the "reasonable person-free to
leave" test of Mendenhall to find that the defendant had been
seized. 63 In addition, Justice Blackmun, although dissenting, ex-
pressly concurred in the plurality's adoption of the Mendenhall
standard.64
Royer was an "airport 'stop for questioning' case similar in its
general setting" to Mendenhall.65 Royer was observed at Miami In-
ternational Airport by two plainclothes detectives who believed
Royer's conduct to be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying
narcotics. 66 On the concourse leading to the boarding area, the two
57 The officer had testified that Mendenhall was not free to leave. Id. at 575 n.12
(White, J., dissenting).
58 446 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
59 Id. at 560 n.l.
60 Id. at 569-71 (White, J., dissenting). See also Williamson, supra note 12, at 784 (it is
unclear whetherJustice White's criticism ofJustice Stewart's opinion was "for purposes
of demonstrating that the 'reasonable man' standard should not be controlling, or
merely for purposes of demonstrating the analytical weakness of the Stewart opinion in
Mendenhall.").
61 Becton, supra note 18, at 463 ("Immediately after Mendenhall and Reid confusion
abounded among lower courts.");
62 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
63 Id. at 502 ("These circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority such
that a 'reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' ")
64 Id. at 514. The three remaining dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Rehn-
quist, who originally joined with Stewart in the lead opinion in Mendenhall setting forth
the "reasonable person" standard, also seemed to agree that the Mendenhall standard
was the correct one. Id. at 523 n.3.
65 Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring).
66 They believed his appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the so-called
drug courier profile. Id. at 493. In Royer's case:
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detectives approached Royer, identified themselves as police of-
ficers, and asked if Royer had a moment to speak with them. Royer
said "yes." The officer requested, and Royer produced, his airline
ticket bearing the name "Holt" and a driver's license in the name of
Royer. When asked about the discrepancy, Royer explained that a
friend had made the reservation in the name of "Holt." According
to the officers, Royer became noticeably more nervous during this
conversation. The officers informed Royer that they were narcotics
investigators and that they had reason to suspect him of transport-
ing narcotics.
67
Without returning his ticket (a fact which turned out to be cru-
cial),68 the officers asked Royer to accompany them to the adjacent
concourse approximately 40 feet away. Without responding, Royer
went with the officers to a room located in the flight attendants'
lounge which contained a small desk and two chairs. Royer's lug-
gage was retrieved from the airline without his consent and brought
to the room. In response to a request for consent to search the lug-
gage, Royer produced a key to one suitcase and permitted the of-
ficers to pry open the other one. Marijuana was found, and Royer
was arrested. Approximately fifteen minutes had elapsed from the
time the detectives initially approached Royer until his arrest.69
In a plurality opinion joined by three other justices, Justice
White held the searches of the luggage unlawful because at the time
of the search Royer, "as a practical matter," was under arrest,70 and
probable cause did not exist to justify such an arrest.7 1 Preliminary
to this holding, the plurality rejected as untenable the state's argu-
ment that the entire transaction was consensual, finding that at an
early point in the encounter the officers had seized Royer.
72
Although conceding that asking for and examining Royer's ticket
was permissible, the plurality explained:
[W]hen the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told
the detectives attention was attracted by the following facts which were considered
to be within the profile: (a) Royer was carrying American Tourister luggage, which
appeared to be heavy, (b) he was young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casu-
ally dressed, (d) he appeared pale and nervous, looking around at other people,
(e) he paid for his ticket in cash with a large number of bills, and (f) rather than
completing the airline identification tag to be attached to checked baggage, which
had space for a name, address, and telephone number, he wrote only a name and
the destination.
Id. at 493 n.2.
67 Id. at 494.
68 See infra discussion at notes 74-77. See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 503-04 n.9.
69 460 U.S. at 494-95.
70 Id. at 503.
71 Id. at 507.
72 Id. at 501.
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Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him
to accompany them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and
driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to
depart, Royer was effectively seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
73
The Court decided this because "[tihese circumstances surely
amount to a show of official authority such that a 'reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.' "74 Why these
circumstances "surely" amounted to a show of authority such that a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave while the similar cir-
cumstances in Mendenhall did not is not at all clear. The only differ-
ence in this litany of factors is the retention of the license and
ticket. 75 Apparently Justice White felt comfortable having impor-
tant fourth amendment rights turn on what would seem a minor fact
because "[a]s a practical matter, Royer could not leave the airport
without them."' 76 Of course, Mendenhall, as a practical matter, also
could not have left the airport, because a) she didn't believe she was
free to leave and b) the officer would not have permitted her to
leave. The Court's struggle to reconcile the seizure determination
and the split of the Justices as to the correct characterization of
these encounters demonstrates the difficulty of accurately character-
izing police-citizen encounters under the Mendenhall-Royer test.
Perhaps because Royer ultimately prevailed in the case, absent
from Justice White's opinion was his earlier apparent discomfort
with the "free to leave" standard. Also absent-again perhaps be-
cause the seizure issue was not crucial to the outcome of the
case 77 -was any analysis of why the "free to leave" test was the ap-
propriate one to answer the question of whether "the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, [had] in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen . *T"78 The Supreme Court has
never explained its use of the test to answer that question.79 An
73 Id.
74 Id. at 502.
75 Id. at 503-04 n.9.
76 Id. Of course, Justice White also thought a seizure had occurred in Mendenhall.
Nevertheless, he took great pains to distinguish that case from the one before the court,
perhaps for the benefit (or vote) ofJustice Stewart who joined White's opinion in Royer
but had authored the opinion finding no seizure in Mendenhall. See also id. at 508 (Powell,
J., concurring).
77 The seizure issue of itself was not crucial because the plurality believed there was
reasonable suspicion tojustify such a seizure. The question was whether the police had
exceeded the bounds of a Teny stop and, if so, whether they had probable cause to do
so. Id. at 502.
78 460 U.S. at 523 n.3.
79 Williamson, supra note 12, at 814. ("The nuances of [the reasonable person test]
never have been explored fully by the courts ....").
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explanation is called for, however, because in fact the 'free to leave'
test does not accurately measure whether a citizen's liberty has been
in some way restrained. As mentioned earlier, it is generally recog-
nized that most citizens do not feel free to walk away from a police
officer who approaches to ask them questions.8 0 Thus, in a literal
sense, the citizen's liberty "has in some way been restrained." 8'
Moreover, in many cases the citizen's liberty has been restrained in a
very real sense because, in fact, the officer does not intend to let the
citizen continue on their way if they assert their right to do so. 8 2
Thus, the Mendenhall-Royer test is underinclusive to the extent it
does not include these classes of cases within the definition of
seizure. Moreover, it is clear that the Mendenhall-Royer test is not
intended to characterize every encounter in which either of these
situations exist as a seizure. The encounter in Mendenhall itself was
found not to be a seizure by the author of the standard although it
clearly falls into the category where most commentators agree that
an average citizen would not feel free to end the encounter.
8 3
Moreover, Justice Stewart expressly stated in Mendenhall that the
subjective intention of the officer to detain the suspect is irrelevant,
thus excluding from the category of seizure at least some cases
where in fact the citizen is not free to leave.8 4
The underinclusiveness of the Mendenhall-Royer standard has
not led commentators to call for discarding the test. In large part,
this seems to be based on a perception that other alternatives are
unworkable and the Mendenhall-Royer test can be interpreted in such
a way as to strike the appropriate balance between the law enforce-
ment needs of the state and the liberty right of citizens.8 5 However,
as explained below, often the perceived drawbacks to alternative
tests are overstated and the weaknesses of the present test are ig-
nored. Thus, there exists an inflated view of the superiority of the
80 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
81 Williamson, supra note 12, at 790 ("If an individual subjectively believes that he or
she has been deprived of his or her freedom of movement under the guise of official
authority and submits, the deprivation is complete.").
82 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83 As explained above, most commentators believe citizens never feel free to leave
when approached and questioned by a police officer. Moreover, the similarity of Men-
denhall to Royer where an arrest was found, indicates it is unlikely that Sylvia Mendenhall
realistically felt free to leave.
84 Only some cases of this type are excluded because if the officer communicates his
intentions to the suspect, a seizure has occurred under the Mendenhall-Royer standard.
85 See Dix, supra note 6, at 867, 870 ("The Mendenhall-Royer standard might well be
the only appropriate and feasible one"; "the standard might, however, be applied as a
matter of state law in a manner different than was suggested in Delgado."); Williamson,
supra note 12, at 787-90; Note, supra note 6, at 229-31.
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Mendenhall-Royer test. Moreover, courts apply the test in a fashion
that creates an overly broad "nonseizure" category of police-citizen
encounters, thus failing to adequately protect the liberty interests of
citizens.
III. APPLICATION OF THE MENDENHALL-ROYER TEST
A. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The divergent results, despite similar facts, of the two Supreme
Court cases that formulated the Mendenhall-Royer test are indicative
of the difficulty in applying the test. The only factual difference be-
tween the two cases at the point the plurality found Royer was
seized was the retention of Royer's airline ticket and identification.
Yet the results are vastly different. Justice Stewart did not even find
that Mendenhall had been seized during her ordeal, while the plu-
rality found that Royer was not only seized, but also arrested. 6
Moreover, in finding a seizure of Royer, the plurality pointed to
facts that also were present in Mendenhall.87 The Court's cases fol-
lowing Mendenhall and Royer provide no further elucidation. In Reid
v. Georgia,88 again on facts "remarkably similar"8 9 to Mendenhall, the
86 Although at the point in the encounter that the plurality found Royer was "for all
practical purposes under arrest" there were additional factual differences-Royer was
taken to a room described as a closet as opposed to the larger room in Mendenhall and
Royer's luggage had been retrieved without his consent-it is unlikely these facts would
have been sufficient to escalate the encounter into an arrest if the plurality had charac-
terized the encounter at that point, like Mendenhall's, as consensual. Conversely, if
Mendenhall's early contact with the police was characterized a seizure, her detention,
even in a large room, would have likely amounted to an arrest. Thus, the different treat-
ment of the cases resulted from the differing characterization of the early encounter,
which apparently was based on the single factual difference mentioned above-the re-
tention of Royer's identification and airline ticket.
The divergent results demonstrate a collateral effect of expanding the "non-
seizure" category through the application of the Mendenhall-Royer test. The middle cate-
gory in the analysis, brief "seizures" that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, in
some respects seems to be disappearing. This is because the level of intrusiveness re-
quired before a seizure is found is so high, that it is very similar to conduct that requires
a finding of an arrest. See United States v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1987)(lower
court found entire encounter non-seizure until point of arrest; appellate court finds
seizure at earlier point); State v. Jones, 495 So. 2d 334 (La. Ct. App. 1986)(lower court
found co-defendant was arrested; appellate court finds no seizure under Mendenhall);
State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339 (R.I. 1986)(applying "free to leave" test to determine
whether suspect arrested).
87 The plurality emphasized that the officers identified themselves as narcotics
agents, informed the suspect of their suspicions, asked him to accompany them to the
police room, and failed to inform him that he was free to depart, all facts that were also
present in Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 547-48. This apparent discrepancy has led one
court to read Royer as limiting Mendenhall to its facts. See United States v. Saperstein, 723
F.2d 1221, 1225 (6th Cir. 1983).
88 448 U.S. 438 (1979).
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Court avoided the seizure issue and remanded to the state appellate
court.90 In a later case, Florida v. Rodriguez,9' the Court only partially
addressed the seizure issue.
In Rodriguez, a Dade County Public Safety Department officer
assigned to the airport unit noticed Rodriguez at the National Air-
lines ticket counter in the Miami airport. Suspicious of the "unusual
manner" in which Rodriguez and two companions left the counter,
the officer and his fellow officer followed the trio. While riding an
escalator in the airport concourse, Rodriguez' companions made
eye contact with the police officers twice and spoke to each other in
low voices. As they exited the escalator, one of the companions
twice exhorted Rodriguez to "get out of here." At that point, Rodri-
guez caught sight of the detectives and unsuccessfully attempted to
leave.92 "His legs were pumping up and down very fast and not
covering much ground, but his legs were as if the person were run-
ning in place." 93 Rodriguez then confronted the officer and uttered
a vulgar exclamation. In the face of this conduct, the officer
"showed his badge and asked [Rodriguez] if they might talk. [Rod-
riguez] agreed, and [the officer] suggested that they move approxi-
mately fifteen feet to where [his companions] were standing with
[the other officer] . . ,,94 In the discussion that followed, Rodri-
guez, prompted by one of his companions, provided a key to a suit
89 Id. at 443 (Powell, J. concurring).
90 In Reid, the defendant and a companion were approached outside the Atlanta air-
port terminal by a DEA agent who suspected them of carrying narcotics. The agent
identified himself as a federal narcotics agent and asked Reid and his companion to
show him their airline tickets and identification, which they did. The agent asked if they
would agree to return to the terminal and consent to a search of their persons and their
bags. The agent testified that the pair agreed. As the suspects and the agent entered
the terminal, the defendant began to run. Before he was apprehended, he abandoned
his shoulder bag. The bag was recovered and found to contain cocaine. Id. at 439. Reid
was arrested. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's suppression of the
cocaine, holding that the stop of the defendant was permissible under Terry because
defendant's fit with the drug courier profile provided the necessary reasonable suspi-
cion. Id. at 440-41. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, vacated the state
court's judgment finding as a matter of law that the agent did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to justify a seizure when the agent "stopped" the defendant. Id. at 441. Although
quoting the declaration in Terry that not all intercourse between policemen and citizens
constitute seizures, the Court did not mention the Mendenhall decision and did not de-
cide whether the "stop" constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion. Id. A con-
curring opinion emphasized that that issue was open for the state court to decide on
remand. Id. at 443 (Powell, J., concurring). Taking the hint, the Georgia court found no
seizure and upheld the conviction. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E. 2d 617, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 883 (1981).
91 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
92 Id. at 3-4.
93 Id. at 4.
94 Id.
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bag, which was searched. Cocaine was found and all three individu-
als were arrested.
Addressing the legality of the officer's actions, the Court first
cited Mendenhall and Royer to support the conclusion that "the initial
contact between the officers and respondent, where they simply
asked if he would step aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort
of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment in-
terest." 95 The Court reached this conclusion with no analysis of the
factors deemed significant in Mendenhall and Royer. Particularly in
the face of an attempt to flee and a vulgar exclamation by Rodri-
guez, one wonders what tone of voice the officer used in asking if he
and the suspect "might talk." However, the Court went on immedi-
ately to state that
Assuming, without deciding, that after respondent agreed to talk with
the police, moved over to where his cohorts and the other detective
were standing, and ultimately granted permission to search his bag-
gage, there was a 'seizure' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we
hold that any such seizure was justified by "articulable suspicion." 96
But it is not apparent why, if the initial contact was "clearly" not a
seizure, the conversation that followed could possibly constitute a
seizure. Perhaps it was because the officer was still holding the iden-
tification and tickets when Rodriguez gave him consent to the
search.
In any event, Rodriguez does not provide significant clarification
of the Mendenhall-Royer test. In two sentences, the Court found an
initial contact "clearly" was not a seizure, but the conversation
which immediately followed was assumed to be a seizure. If it is
possible for the Court to provide guidance to lower courts attempt-
ing to reach consistent results under Mendenhall-Royer, Rodriguez cer-
tainly does not provide it.
The only other post-Mendenhall-Royer Supreme Court decision
dealing directly with the issue of when a seizure occurs similarly
does not offer much guidance. I.N.S. v. Delgado9 7 involved a chal-
lenge to immigration officers' practice of conducting "surveys" of
factories in search of illegal aliens. During the surveys, several
agents were positioned near the exits while other agents dispersed
through the factory to question various employees. The agents dis-
played badges, carried walkie-talkies, and were armed but never
drew their weapons. During the survey, employees continued work-
ing and were free to move within the factory. Agents approached
95 Id. at 5-6.
96 Id. at 6.
97 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
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employees, asked them between one and three questions relating to
citizenship, and in some cases requested immigration papers. In a
civil suit challenging the constitutionality of this practice, the Ninth
Circuit applied Mendenhall to conclude that during the surveys,
which lasted from one to two hours, the entire workforce had been
seized because the stationing of agents at the exits meant that "a
reasonable worker 'would have believed he was not free to
leave.' -98
The Supreme Court reversed. Addressing the seizure issue, the
Court first reiterated what had been said in Teny that "not all per-
sonal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures'
of persons" and reaffirmed that the proper test was whether "a rea-
sonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 99
Pointing to Royer as "plainly impl[ying] that interrogation relating to
one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not,
by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure,"100 the Court
found no seizure had occurred when the surveys were conducted.
To justice Rehnquist, the stationing of agents at the exits should not
have resulted in any reasonable apprehension that individuals at-
tempting to leave would be seized or detained in any meaningful
way. 10 1 It was obvious to Justice Rehnquist that the "purpose of the
agents' presence at the factory doors was to insure that all persons
in the factories were questioned."' 1 2 In Justice Rehnquist's view,
this did not give the workers reason to believe that they would be
detained if they gave truthful answers to questions put to them or
simply refused to answer. Moreover, the individual questioning of
employees did not constitute a seizure because there could not be a
reasonable fear that the employees were not free to continue work-
ing or move about the factory. This was despite the fact that indi-
98 Id. at 214.
99 Id. at 215.
100 Id. at 216.
101 Id. at 219. It is not clear why Justice Rehnquist felt that the workers had to fear
seizure or detention in a "meaningful" way. Previous cases had made clear that a deten-
tion, no matter how brief, constitutes a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. See
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. at 440; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (citing United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556 (1980)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19. Thus, requir-
ing that the detention be "meaningful" beyond a momentary stop would signal a signifi-
cant change in the definition of seizure. The focus in previous cases, including
Mendenhall and Royer, was whether a detention-no matter how brief-resulted from a
show of authority or physical force by police, not whether a detention resulting from
such action was meaningful in any other sense. It is possible that Justice Rehnquist
included the modifier "meaningful" to distinguish it from the momentary pause the
worker might have to make to simply listen to the agent's request to answer some
questions.
102 466 U.S. at 218.
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viduals attempting to flee or evade the agents eventually were
detained. 103
Concurring in the result, Justice Powell again characterized the
seizure issue as a "close one" because it turned on a "difficult char-
acterization of fact and law: whether a reasonable person in respon-
dent's position would have believed he was free to refuse to answer
the questions put to him by INS officers and leave the factory."
10 4
In Justice Powell's view, the issue did not have to be decided be-
cause any seizure was of such a character that it was justified as part
of the government's special interest in controlling illegal immigra-
tion. As one commentator has stated:
Taken at face value, the Court's discussion in Delgado presents a con-
fusing and uncertain application of the objective standard to which a
majority of the Justices seem committed. The discussion suggests that
a reasonable person would consider himself able in effect to ignore the
questions of an officer stationed at the door and would feel free to
leave the location. Insofar as this reflects the standard of objective
reasonableness adopted by the Supreme Court, the Court seems to
have lost contact with reality. If nonarrest detention law is developed
on the basis of the Delgado approach, it will leave totally unregulated a
large number of situations in which law enforcement activity actually
and significantly intrudes upon the liberty interests of citizens. 105
B. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
It seems clear that lower courts have taken Delgado at face value.
They are engaged in defining the parameters of an artificial reason-
able person that has little contact with reality. As Professor Dix
predicts, the result is to leave a large number of police-citizen en-
counters totally unregulated. Moreover, the line between regulated
and unregulated police activity is an uncertain one. Because the
reasonable person standard is an artificial one and not truly based
on whether a citizen feels free to leave, the cases lack consistency
103 Id. at 220.
104 Id. at 221 (Powell, J., concurring).
105 Dix, supra note 6, at 869. Professor Dix goes on to explain:
Alternatively, Delgado can be read as recognizing that a reasonable person would
perceive that he was required to stop and listen to an officer's queries, but not to
respond. Such a situation, the opinion further suggests, might not be a "meaning-
ful" interference with liberty and thus might not be subject to fourth amendment
9crutiny. If this is an accurate reading, the opinion modifies the reasonable expecta-
tion test by requiring that the perceived lack of freedom to leave be "meaningful,"
and. by concluding that a detention for purposes of brief questioning is not a
"meaningful" interference with the detainee's liberty. This approach either aban-
dons or distorts the reasonable expectation standard.
Id.
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and predictability. Instead, slight factual variations often determine
important fourth amendment rights.
Many of the cases applying the Mendenhall-Royer standard in-
volve encounters with air travelers suspected of transporting narcot-
ics. These cases are virtually uniform in holding that a police officer
does not seize an individual merely by approaching him or her, ask-
ing if he or she would mind answering a few questions, and request-
ing the individual's identification and airline ticket.' 0 6 This is
probably because it is relatively easy to approach an individual in an
airport without restricting that individual's movement and to gain
his or her attention politely and ask the initial questions required to
characterize the encounter as consensual. 107 In airports people
watch television, sit in bars and snack bars, wait for taxis and lug-
gage, and generally engage in activities that make it easy to ap-
proach them without "stopping" them.108 Thus, in airport cases the
focus of the seizure determination is on police conduct following
the initial "approach."'' 0 9
106 United States v. Mancini, 802 F.2d 1326 (1 1th Cir. 1986); United States v. Leh-
mann, 798 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853 (7th Cir.
1986); United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Borys,
766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1983)(en banc); United States v. Pirelli, 650 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mass. 1986); Wilson v.
Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 195 Cal. Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325 (1983); Jacobson v.
State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985); Goodman v. State, 180 Ga. App. 347, 349 S.E.2d 216
(1986). But see United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1983)(asking for and
taking airline ticket was clear objective indication that suspect was being detained).
107 United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 595 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)("In an airport
stop... it is possible for [an officer] not to interfere with an individual's progress in any
way and to ascertain whether that individual is willing to cooperate ....").
1O8 United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987)(agents approach suspect
at taxi stand); United States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1986)(agents sit next to
suspect watching television in concourse); United States v. Mancini, 802 F.2d 1326 (11 th
Cir. 1986)(agents approach suspect sitting in airport bar); Goodman v. State, 180 Ga.
App. 347, 349 S.E.2d 216 (1986)(agent sits next to suspect in airport concourse).
109 Street encounters are not so easily accomplished. The officer may be in a squad
car while the suspect is walking, riding a bicycle, or also in a car. The officer may not be
able to easily "cross paths" with the citizen in order to get her attention politely and to
request cooperation without at least momentarily stopping the individual. Courts have
struggled with what actions a police officer may take to gain the individual's attention
and accomplish the "approach" without implicating the fourth amendment. For exam-
ple, one court has found that the fourth amendment is not implicated when an officer
calls to a citizen, "Police. Wait a second. We want to talk to you," Richardson v. United
States, 520 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C. 1987). but is implicated when the officer calls "Come
here, police officers." Johnson v. United States, 468 A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. 1983). The
court cited favorably a pre-Mendenhall case finding no seizure when an officer ap-
proached an individual, touched his arm and said, "Hold it, sir, could I speak with you
for a second." United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1972). If officers
"block" an individual's path in order to request cooperation, courts are likely to find a
seizure has occurred from the outset of the encounter. See United States v. Verrusio,
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The facts of the airport narcotics cases are remarkably similar.
In each case, federal agents develop "suspicion" of a passenger ar-
riving on flights from "source cities." The agents follow the individ-
ual for a short time and, before the suspect leaves the airport or
when he or she is just outside the airport, approach the suspect,
identify themselves, and ask if the suspect will agree to talk to the
742 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1984)(seizure where officer "intercepted" defendant and placed
hand on shoulder); State v. Davis, 517 A.2d 859 (NJ. 1986)(officer stopped defendant
on bicycle by blocking his path with patrol car). But see Cox v. State, 489 So. 2d 612
(Ala. 1985)(no seizure of defendant sitting in squad car despite directions by sheriff to
deputy to "watch him"); Purce v. United States, 482 A.2d 772 (D.C. 1984)(no seizure
although defendant testified officer's patrol car blocked his ability to leave in his own
car).
Courts similarly have found it difficult to delineate appropriate conduct for police
officers approaching individuals in parked cars. Thus, when a police officer parked his
car behind and to the left of a car parked in a parking lot and activated his lights prior to
approaching the car, a seizure occurred in People v. Bailey, 176 Cal. App. 3d 402, 222
Cal. Rptr. 235 (1985), as it did when an officer approached a car parked in an airport
parking lot, requested the driver's identification, and asked a question while retaining
the license in United States v. Thompson, 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2479 (11 th Cir. Au-
gust 22, 1983)(officer testified that he approached defendant to warn him that he faced a
large parking lot charge when he exited). However, when an officer parked his squad
car behind a car parked in a lot with the driver apparently sleeping or unconscious,
tapped on the window with a flashlight, and asked for an explanation of the individual's
presence and for identification, a seizure did not occur. Purce v. United States, 482 A.2d
772 (D.C. 1984). Similarly, when an officer followed a car and parked behind it when it
stopped to pick up a passenger, approached the car, and requested identification, the
encounter was described as "an innocuous police-citizen encounter not implicating the
fourth amendment." State v. Harlan, 301 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Iowa 1981).
Obviously, it is difficult for a police officer to be guided by these cases; all four were
very similar factually but the results differ. Certainly it seems an officer seeking to avoid
a seizure should not activate the lights of the squad car. Presumably this is a "show of
authority" indicating the citizen is not free to leave. See People v. Bailey, 176 Cal. App.
3d 235, 222 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1985); State v. Harlan, 301 N.W.2d at 720 (no seizure when
officer did not turn on red or yellow flashers); State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wash.
App. 452, 711 P.2d 1096 (1985)(important to finding of no seizure that officer did not
use flashing lights and siren). If the basis for finding a seizure is that activating lights
constitutes a show of authority, is it any less a show of authority to park behind a car and
approach it without activating the lights? Certainly a citizen is unlikely to perceive that
she is free to drive away in the latter case. Even if the officer does not activate the ligHts,
the cases are unclear as to what further steps the officer may take. Compare United States
v. Thompson, 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2479 (11 th Cir. August 22, 1983)(holding license
produced on request and asking question constitutes seizure) with Purce v. United
States, 482 A.2d 772 (D.C. 1984)(asking for explanation of presence and identification
not a seizure). See also People v. Hardy, 42 Il. App. 3d 108, 491 N.E.2d 493 (1986)(ap-
parently treating initial "stop and questioning" of suspect sitting in parked truck as a
seizure beyond scope of Teny stop when officer retained license and asked suspect if he
"would mind" accompanying officer to station).
Moreover, even an "innocuous" purpose for the approach will not guarantee a non-
seizure determination. One court has found officers approaching a car for reasons other
than criminal investigation to have effected a seizure of the occupants of the car. United
States v. Thompson, 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2479 (11 th Cir. August 22, 1983)(officer
approached vehicle to warn driver to expect large parking lot charge).
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agents. If, as almost invariably happens, the suspect agrees, the
agents request the suspect's identification and airline ticket. The
agents generally return the ticket and identification" 0 and request
either that the suspect accompany them to an office for further ques-
tioning or that the suspect consent to a search of his or her luggage.
If the individual consents and drugs are found, the suspect is
arrested.
Given the almost uniform facts of these cases, one would expect
uniform treatment by the courts. However, even when the final re-
sults are the same and the search is found lawful, the ultimate out-
come often results from different analyses. Some courts find no
seizure occurred and deem the entire transaction consensual and
lawful. " ' I A significant number of courts, however, find the encoun-
ter constitutes a seizure at some point. 1 2 Often these courts up-
hold the search nevertheless because the seizure is justified by the
required level of suspicion." 13 In still other cases, courts find suffi-
cient justification for the seizure lacking and suppress the
evidence. 114
Almost all courts accept the proposition that the agents in these
cases, by merely approaching the individual, requesting to speak
with them, and asking for identification, have not "seized" the indi-
vidual. Although virtually all courts apply the Mendenhall-Royer test,
judicial response to the agents' conduct beyond that point is less
110 This is true at least since Royer in which the Court emphasized the agents' reten-
tion of the ticket as crucial to its finding of a seizure. See United States v. Robinson, 690
F.2d 869 (11 th Cir. 1982)(agent Markonni testified that returning ticket was part of his
"property procedure" for airport encounters).
I"' United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); United States v. Berryman, 717
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1983)(en banc); United States v. Regan, 687 F.2d 531 (1st Cir. 1982);
United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1982); Pastor v. State, 498 So. 2d 962
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(train station case); Goodman v. State, 180 Ga. App. 347, 349
S.E.2d 216 (1986); State v. Jones, 495 So. 2d 334 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
112 See infra cases cited in notes 116-21.
113 United States v. Lehmann, 798 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hanson,
801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d
1283 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1983)(assuming
seizure, reasonable suspicion present); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294 (1Ith Cir. 1982); United States v. Davis,
638 F. Supp. 472 (D. Mass. 1986); Stabenow v. State,. 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
114 United States v. Glass, 741 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Saperstein,
723 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Regan, 687 F.2d 531 (1st Cir. 1982)(rea-
sonable suspicion justifies detention, but detention exceeds scope of Teny; evidence sup-
pressed); United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Pirelli, 650 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mass. 1986); United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp.
665 (D. Mass. 1986); Wilson v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 195 Cal. Rptr. 671, 670
P.2d 325 (1983); Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
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consistent. Courts have adopted "watershed points," 1 5 at which
the encounter becomes a seizure, that vary from retaining the indi-
vidual's ticket and identification, 1 6 informing the individual of the
officer's suspicions," t 7 directing a question to the individual
designed to confirm or dispel suspicion, 1 8 requesting the individual
to accompany officers to another location," t9 requesting permission
to search, 120 and threatening to seek a warrant to search. 121 Courts
deem these "points" crucial because, in their view, at this point the
character of the encounter changes to such a degree that a reason-
able person would no longer feel free to walk away.
Beyond the concern that different courts are using different
"watershed points," there also exists a concern that these watershed
points are merely technical constructs bearing little relation to
115 See United States v. Waskal, 709 F.2d 653, 661 n.14 (11th Cir. 1983)(noting that
several courts find retention of ticket and identification to be "watershed point" in
seizure determination); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1982)(same);
United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42, 44 n.3 (1st Cir. 1981).
116 United States v. Thompson, 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2479 (11 th Cir. August 22,
1983) (seizure when officer held license while making additional requests); United States
v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294
( Ith Cir. 1982).
117 United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986)(officer also still retaining
license); United States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1986)(no seizure until officer told
defendant he was suspect and requested consent to search); United States v. Cordell,
723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983)(handing I.D. and ticket to another officer and informing
defendant of narcotics investigation transformed consensual encounter into detention);
Wilson v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 670 P.2d 325, 195 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983)(of-
ficer told suspect he had information that the suspect was carrying a lot of drugs). See
also United States v. Mancini, 802 F.2d 1326 (11 th Cir. 1986)(no seizure although of-
ficers identified themselves as narcotics officers, but neither accused the defendant nor
stated that they suspected him of carrying drugs).
118 United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1986)(seizure oc-
curred when officers, after identifying themselves, asked defendant if they could talk and
asked from where he was arriving).
119 United States v. Lehmann, 798 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1986)(no seizure until agents
asked defendant in airport parking lot to accompany them to FAA office); United States
v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982)(seizure based on request for identification and
immediate request to accompany to another location).
120 United States v. Gonzalez, 43 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2095 (5th Cir. April 1,
1988)(encounter rose to seizure when federal agent tells suspect he is working narcotics
and requests permission to look in bag); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.
1985)(seizure when police told the individual he was a suspect and requested permission
to search); but seejacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985)(no seizure when officers
approached airport travelers, displayed badges, asked to talk, identified themselves as
narcotics officers, and requested permission to search); Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(no seizure when officers approached suspect, but seizure oc-
curred when they asked him for identification, identified themselves as police officers,
and requested permission to search).
121 United States v. Pirelli, 650 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mass. 1986)(consensual encounter
became seizure when officers asked suspect for consent to search bag and told him they
would seek search warrant if consent denied).
EDWIN J. BUTTERFOSS
whether the character of the encounter has in fact changed in any
significant way so that the citizen feels differently about his or her
options to walk away. If courts are attempting to make a realistic
appraisal of whether the citizen reasonably feels free to walk away,
the encounter should be deemed a seizure at an earlier point. 122 If
that is not their purpose, it must be frustrating to police officers who
perceive little difference in their conduct on either side of the "wa-
tershed point." Whatever the courts' reasons, the end result is va-
ried treatment of nearly identical situations.
Most courts treat the encounter as a seizure if the agent retains
the ticket and identification for even a short period of time beyond
that necessary to ascertain the information contained in them. 123
This apparently is a response to the fact that the primary distinction
between Mendenhall, in which Justice Stewart found no seizure, and
Royer, in which the Court found a "de facto" arrest, was the officer's
retention of Royer's ticket and identification. Lower courts have not
failed to notice this point and, understandably, have elevated the
factor to crucial importance. Courts are not as certain, however, as
to what conduct will constitute a seizure if the ticket is returned.
Several courts have found seizures when police officers inform
the individual that the police suspect them of carrying narcotics and
request consent to search the suspect's luggage.1 24 These courts
seem unwilling to extend the fiction that a reasonable person feels
free to leave when approached by a police officer beyond the point
where what was already implicit is made explicit-that the individual
is suspected of criminal activity. This is a logical extension of the
notion that the "nonseizure" category of police-citizen encounters
is made up of "innocuous" police-citizen exchanges. It recognizes
the reality that encounters in which the officer suspects the individ-
ual of criminal activity and is seeking incriminating information are
entirely different from encounters "wholly unrelated to the crime
fighting function" referred to in Terry. Although these courts are
willing to accept the characterization of these encounters as "innoc-
uous" nonseizures when the officer is. polite and does not overtly
122 See United States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1983)(Swygert, J., con-
curring)("as a factual psychological matter people who are stopped for questioning of
this kind . . . generally do not feel free to leave."); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129
(7th Cir. 1982)(Swygert, J., dissenting)(reasonable person does not feel free to leave
when first approached); United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040 (D.C. 1985)(noting that
it would be hard to imagine that anyone would feel free to walk away when approached
by officer); State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 519 A.2d 322 (NJ. 1987)(few individuals be-
lieve they can refuse to respond to questions by police officers).
123 See cases cited supra note 116.
124 See cases cited supra notes 117 and 120.
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indicate suspicion, they refuse to stretch that characterization to in-
clude encounters where the officer makes known his or her suspi-
cions. Although admirable in the protection they provide to citizens
by finding a seizure early in the encounter, in reality it is questiona-
ble whether the character of these encounters has changed so signif-
icantly at this point that it should suddenly be scrutinized under the
fourth amendment. 25 For instance, in United States v. Borys,' 26 the
defendant was approached and questioned "sporadically" for forty-
five minutes as he moved through the concourse. 127 Moreover, he
was overtly followed between the instances of questioning. The
court, although admitting that the suspect may not have felt free to
leave, found no seizure because a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave.' 28 However, the court did find a seizure when the
agents explained to defendant that he was a suspect and requested
permission to search his bag. 129 Surely it was obvious to the de-
fendant-and any reasonable person-that the police suspected him
of criminal activity long before this. The court's test is unrealistic if
the question is when did the suspect realize this was not an "innocu-
ous" encounter. However, at least the court refused to continue to
wear blinders when the police made it explicit that the encounter
was for criminal investigation of the defendant. Other courts are
unwilling to find a seizure even when this is true.
130
In truth, courts refusing to find a seizure at the point when po-
125 Police have responded by going to great lengths to avoid expressing their suspi-
cions of the citizen whom they "encounter." See United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d
651, 653 (1st Cir. 1983)(when defendant asked what the problem was, officer responded
"drug traffic between Ft. Lauderdale and Boston is high."); Pastor v. State, 498 So. 2d
962, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)(officers approached defendant in train station and
asked for help "combatting the narcotics problem in South Florida"); State v. Hoffpauir,
44 Wash. App. 195, 197, 722 P.2d 113, 114 (1986)(officer asked defendant to accom-
pany him to discuss "a problem downtown").
126 766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985).
127 Id. at 311.
128 Id.
129 Id. However, by this time, the court found that reasonable suspicion justifying the
stop existed. The court noted that Borys arrived from a source city, traveled first class
but carried two bulky garment bags into and off of the plane, had purchased his tickets
with cash, was dressed casually, had no identification, was walking extremely fast, was
nervous when questioned, and gave a deceptive answer about the length of his stay in
Florida. Id.
130 See United States v. Mancini, 802 F.2d 1326 (11 th Cir. 1986)(no seizure when of-
ficers identified themselves, explained their purpose of investigating narcotics smug-
gling, and requested permission to search defendant's bags); Jacobson v. State, 476 So.
2d 1282 (Fla. 1985)(no seizure when officers identified themselves as narcotic agents
and requested permission to search bags); State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 350, 346
S.E.2d 596, 600 (1986)(no seizure even when officer told defendant that "I just wanted
to meet a cold-blooded killer.").
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lice inform the individual of their suspicions seem more consistent
with Justice Stewart's opinion in Mendenhall. In Mendenhall, the fact
that the agents' suspicions were revealed to the defendant and per-
mission requested to search did not move Justice Stewart to find a
seizure.' 3 1 The apparently inconsistent results seem to result from
a different focus by the lower courts. Justice Stewart's concern in
Mendenhall was whether the police were impolite or overbearing
such that a message was conveyed that the individual was not free to
leave. 132 Other courts seem more (or at least also) concerned that
the encounter retain a character of a casual, innocent encounter.133
Such a focus can lead to seizure determination very early in the en-
counter. In United States v. Gallego-Zapata,'3 4 the government con-
ceded that a seizure occurred when DEA agents identified
themselves, requested to talk to the defendants, and asked from
where they were arriving. The court agreed stating that "[alt that
point a reasonable person would not have felt free to walk away.
Clearly the agents' questions were in the manner of an investiga-
tion-an attempt to verify or dispel their suspicions. This went well
beyond a casual encounter with a law enforcement officer in a public
place."1 35
Similarly, in Daniels v. State, 136 the court found no seizure on the
initial approach by the agents. However, when the officer asked for
identification, informed the suspect that they were narcotics officers,
and requested consent to search, a seizure occurred. 137 The court
pointed out that "Justice Brennan would also agree: It is simply
wrong to suggest a traveler feels free to walk away when approached
by individuals who have identified themselves as police officers and
asked for, and received, his airline ticket and driver's license."' 38
Other courts similarly seem to accept the Mendenhall-Royer test
but apply it more strictly than Mendenhall suggests it should be.
They have found as little as a request for identification and a request
for the individual to accompany the agents to another office to be a
seizure. 1
39
131 446 U.S. at 558.
132 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 801 (recognizing that under Mendenhall social
amenities seem to govern seizure determination).
133 See supra discussion accompanying notes 124-30.
134 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1985).
135 Id. at 671.
136 718 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
137 Id. at 706.
138 Id. at 706 n.2.
139 United States v. Lehmann, 798 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Saper-
stein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1225 (6th Cir. 1983)(stating that Mendenhall has "clearly been lim-
ited to its facts"); United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Dix,
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Despite this apparent reluctance to apply Mendenhall-Royer with
its full force, there has been little indication that courts may be will-
ing to reject the test itself. Perhaps this is because the courts feel
comfortable with the results of applying the "modified" Mendenhall-
Royer test. They may also be uncertain about the feasibility of other
tests. Of course, lower federal courts are not free to reject the Men-
denhall-Royer test. However, even commentators have been surpris-
ingly content with the test.140 As discussed below, this is in part due
to a failure to fairly analyze possible alternatives and a belief that
Mendenhall-Royer can be modified to provide appropriate results.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE MENDENHALL-ROYER TEST
Most commentators recognize that the Mendenhall-Royer test as
applied does not distinguish accurately between cases in which an
average citizen would and would not feel free to end an encounter
with a police officer. It is not accurate because in virtually every
police-citizen encounter the average citizen does not feel free to
walk away.14 ' Thus, if the Mendenhall-Royer test was applied consis-
tent with reality, all police-citizen encounters would be seizures. 142
The Mendenhall-Royer test instead classifies some police-citizen en-
counters as nonseizures based on whether a reasonable person
supra note 6, at 861 (suggesting a stricter application of Mendenhall as a possibility under
state law).
140 See Dix, supra note 6, at 867 ("Mendenhall-Royer standard might well be the only
appropriate and feasible one"); LaFave, "Fourth Amendment Vagaries," supra note 12,
at 1184-86; Note, "Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A New Starting Point," 9
HOFSTRA L. REv., 211, 229-31 (1980). Even commentators critical of the test seem un-
willing to embrace an alternative test that simply focuses on the purpose of the officer in
initiating the encounter. See Greenberg, supra note 17, at 73-76 (suggesting per se rule
limited to stops based solely on drug courier profile); Williamson, supra note 12 at 788,
801-02 (suggesting investigatory nature of encounter important,,yet not calling for per
se rule); Note, "Reformulating Seizures" supra note 17, at 1502-03 (suggesting mul-
tifactor test).
141 See Becton, supra note 18, at 467-69; Dix, supra note 6, at 869-70; LaFave, "Seizure
Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and
Search Issues," 17 U. Micn.J.L. REF. 417, 423-24 (1984) [hereinafter LaFave, "Seizure
Typology"]; Williamson, supra note 13, at 801; Note, Calif. L. Rev., supra note 17, at
1502. Courts also recognize this deficiency in the Mendenhall-Royer test. See United
States v. Cordell, 723 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983)(Swygert,J., concurring)(as factual psy-
chological matter people stopped for questions of this kind do not feel free to leave);
People v. Spicer, 157 Cal. App. 3d 213, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1985)(greatest legal fiction
of the 20th Century may be that people feel free to walk away during police-citizen en-
counters); United States v. Barnes, 496 A.2d 1040 (D.C. 1985)(hard to imagine anyone
feeling free to walk away); State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d 145 (La. 1979)(Dennis, J., dissent-
ing)(to suppose that individual feels free to leave during encounter with police is
"fanciful").
142 See LaFave, "Seizure Typology," supra note 141, at 424.
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would have felt free to walk away, ignoring the subjective impres-
sions of the citizen.
The Mendenhall-Royer test also ignores the subjective intent of
the officer involved even when that intent is to detain the individual.
Justice Stewart made clear in his opinion in Mendenhall that the of-
ficer's subjective intention to detain the suspect is irrelevant, unless
it is conveyed to the suspect. 143 Although it is understandable why a
suspect's subjective belief cannot decide the issue of seizure, 144 it is
not apparent why the officer's subjective intention should be dis-
missed as irrelevant. The result in many cases is a characterization
of police-citizen encounters that is pure fiction. The citizen does
not feel free to leave,' 45 nor will the officer permit it, yet the en-
counter is a "nonseizure" under the Mendenhall-Royer test. Such a
characterization has been described as perhaps "the greatest legal
fiction of the late 20th century." 146 Nevertheless, courts persist in
having important fourth amendment rights of citizens turn on such
a fiction. 1
47
An obvious way to avoid this fiction is to consider the subjective
intent of the police officer. This would remove at least the "total
fiction" cases-those where the citizen does not feel free to leave
and, in fact, is not free to leave because the officer would detain
her-from the nonseizure category. Because the actual intent of the
officer was to detain the individual, a seizure would be found. Of
course, under this test, even cases where the individual did feel free
to leave, but the officer's intent was to detain, would be seizures.
143 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6 (1980).
144 See LaFave, "Seizure Typology," supra note 141, at 423.
145 This is due either to the inherently compelling nature of the officer's authority or
to another subtle reason such as tone of voice or hand on gun. Of course, it is possible
that if the overt (but subtle) factors are revealed to the court, a seizure could be found
under Mendenhall-Royer.
146 People v. Spicer, 157 Cal. App. 3d 213, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (1985). The Court
was referring to Justice Dennis' characterization of the test in State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d
145, 149 (La. 1979)(Dennis, J., dissenting):
Once the confrontation was forced by the officers, it is fanciful to suppose that the
defendant was free to walk away. The officers admitted in their testimony that if the
defendant had attempted to leave he would have been stopped by force. If both
officers and the defendant knew that the defendant would be physically restrained if
he had tried to walk away, it is legalistic, but not realistic, to pretend that an ordi-
nary citizen would be aware of or believe in, much less rely upon, the majority's
shibboleth, viz., "the mere fact that the police approach a citizen and address him
does not compel that citizen to respond to the inquiries or comply with their re-
quest; legally, nothing prevents his choosing not to answer and walking away."
147 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d 145
(La. 1979); State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1344 (R.I. 1986). But see Wells v. State, 716 S.W.2d
715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 12, Section 9.2(h)
at 407 n.219 (citing decisions of a "few courts" finding seizure based on officer's subjec-
tive intentions).
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For that reason, some may view the test as overinclusive; that is, if a
person does feel free to leave (even mistakenly) there has been no
seizure. However, few cases of that sort are likely to occur when the
officer intends to detain.
Professor LaFave voices additional objections to the use of the
officer's actual intent. He states that considering the officer's inten-
tions is "not a useful approach." 148 He believes it is unrealistic be-
cause in most instances the officer will not think ahead to the
possibility of the citizen attempting to leave. 149 Moreover, accord-
ing to LaFave, an advance decision by the officer as to whether he or
she has sufficient suspicion to detain the suspect if the suspect at-
tempts to leave is irrelevant because evasive action by the suspect
may increase the level of suspicion and justify the detention. 150 Fi-
nally, Professor LaFave fears that considering the intentions of po-
lice officers will simply mean that the cases will "be decided by
swearing contests in which officers would regularly maintain their
lack of intention to assert power over a suspect save when the cir-
cumstances would make such a claim absurd."' 5'
Although in some cases it will be diffcult to ascertain whether
the officer intended to detain the suspect, it does not necessarily
follow that the officer's subjective intentions are irrelevant. Proof
that the officer intended to detain is proof that the citizen was, in
fact, seized, and should be at least one method of demonstrating a
seizure. Although it may be true in most instances that the officers
will not consider the possibility that the suspect may attempt to
leave, in some cases the officer will admit that he or she would have
detained the individual, and in other cases it will be clear that if the
officer had been forced to make the decision, he or she would have
detained the suspect. In these instances, a seizure should be found.
The officer's subjective intention also is not rendered irrelevant
by the fact that a suspect's attempt to leave can significantly change
the situation. An encounter is classified as a nonseizure because, at
148 LaFave, "Seizure Typology," supra note 141, at 422. Professor LaFave also rejects
a test based on the subjective intentions of the suspect and a test based on consent.
Interestingly, Professor LaFave rejects the latter because "[tit is nothing more than a
fiction to say that all of these suspects have assented to the confrontation." W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra, note 12, at 408. Yet Professor LaFave does not completely
eliminate consent as a consideration. He points out that in some cases "it will be clear
that the suspect did consent to the encounter, thus obviating any need to inquire further
into the seizure issue." Id. A similar approach could be taken with regard to the of-
ficer's subjective intentions. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
149 LaFave, "Seizure Typology," supra note 141, at 422.
150 Id. at 423.
151 Id.
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least theoretically, a citizen should feel free to leave or decline to
cooperate without suffering any consequences. It certainly seems
useful to inquire as to the officer's intention in such a case; police
officers should know how they would react to a legitimate exercise
of rights by a citizen. 152 Moreover, it seems unlikely that an officer
would approach a suspect and then allow the suspect, now alerted to
the officer's suspicion, simply to walk away.
Finally, there are two responses to the concern that officers
would simply testify that their intention was not to detain the indi-
vidual regardless of what they truly intended that merit discussion.
First, it seems poor fourth amendment jurisprudence to let the pos-
sibility of perjury by law enforcement personnel dissuade a court
from utilizing, even as an alternative, an appropriate test.153 Sec-
ond, it is not at all clear that the Mendenhall-Royer test eliminates the
possibility of manipulation of results by the testimony of police of-
ficers. If a subtle distinction is drawn between permissible and im-
permissible exploitation of the inherent coercion of a police officer's
authority based on factors such as tone of voice, use of force, and
length of control over identification, it seems likely that the result
will be swearing contests in which officers regularly maintain that
their conduct, tone of voice, and statements to the suspect were
pleasant and polite, suggesting nothing remotely close to a show of
authority, while the suspect's recollection of the transaction will be
just the opposite. 154
152 In Goodman v. State, 180 Ga. App. 347, 349 S.E.2d 216 (1986), when a suspect
asked Agent Markonni, perhaps the most experienced agent in airport stops, what would
happen if the suspect refused consent, Markonni replied that he "did not want to discuss
that" and would like the suspect to make the decision. The court found no seizure oc-
curred under these circumstances. One wonders how a citizen is supposed to know
whether or not he or she is free to refuse consent and walk away if the officer is not
certain or at least is unwilling to reveal his intentions.
153 See Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 112-13 (1982).
154 Of course, it may be easier-or at least less subject to detection-to lie about one's
state of mind as opposed to lying about actions actually taken. However, a significant
problem in determining what actually happened during police-citizen encounters exists.
See United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987)(federal agents and defend-
ant do not remember events in same way; court accepts defendant's version); United
States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1986)(several discrepancies between officers testi-
mony and that of defendant); United States v. Verrusio, 742 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir.
1984) (court disbelieves agent's testimony concerning timing of explaining constitutional
rights); United States v. Waskal, 709 F.2d 653 (1 th Cir. 1983)(defendant's version of
facts differs substantially from officer's; states attorney originally refused to prosecute
because persuaded by defendant's account); United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980 (8th
Cir. 1983)(court notes discrepancy between agent's version and defendant's version of
the encounter); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)(noting the
difficult factual findings required under Mendenhall-Royer standard and that they are sub-
ject to easy distortion or poor recall); United States v. Pirelli, 650 F. Supp. 1254 (D.
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Professor LaFave suggests that rather than abandoning the
Mendenhall-Royer test, the standard simply should not be given a lit-
eral reading. He proposes:
[W]hat is needed is an interpretation of the Mendenhall-Royer test which
is grounded in the proposition that police, without having later to jus-
tify their conduct by articulating a certain degree of suspicion, should
be allowed "to seek cooperation, even where this may involve incon-
venience or embarrassment for the citizen, and even though many citi-
zens will defer to this authority of the police because they believe--in
some vague way-that they should."1 55
Professor LaFave then provides the required interpretation. Under
his interpretation, the seizure question turns on whether the officer
adds to the inherent pressures that compel individuals to cooperate
with police officers "by engaging in conduct significantly beyond
that accepted in social intercourse." 156 Under this standard, "[t]he
critical factor is whether the [police officer], even if making inquiries
a private citizen would not,157 has otherwise conducted himself in a
manner which would be perceived as a nonoffensive contact if it oc-
curred between two ordinary citizens."' 158
Although, as Professor LaFave asserts, this approach may be
more compatible with the various views expressed in Royer and
comes closer to explaining the results in the cases than the reason-
Mass. 1986)(officer admits lying about whether telephone tip was received which formed
basis for stop); Wilson v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 670 P.2d 325, 165 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1983)(same); Purce v. United States, 482 A.2d 772 (D.C. 1984)(dispute in testi-
mony concerning whether squad car blocked suspect's ability to leave); Stabenow v.
State, 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)(one officer states he told suspect he was free
to leave but another officer "disagrees"); People v. Chinchillo, 120 A.D.2d 266, 509
N.Y.S.2d 153 (App. Div. 1986)(noting that witnesses for state and for defense testified in
directly contradictory fashion; lower court found both worthy of belief); Daniels v. State,
718 S.W.2d 702, 704 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(noting that defendant testified that
officer did not approach and request consent to search, but blocked his path, slammed
him against lockers, and started searching).
155 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 411 (quoting MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 258 (1975)).
156 Id. at 412.
157 This is necessary to Professor LaFave's test if he is to avoid the same pitfall as the
Mendenhall-Royer test, that is, literal application resulting in every encounter being found
to be a seizure. This is so because one of the first questions asked is for identification,
something a private citizen would not ask. Of course, the disadvantage of this qualifica-
tion to the test is that it reintroduces artificiality and is likely to result in decisions as
inconsistent as those under Mendenhall-Royer.
158 Id. Professor LaFave explains that:
Under this approach, an officer has not made a seizure if, for example, he interro-
gated "in a conversational tone," "did not order the defendant" to do something or
"demand that he" do it, did not ask questions that were "overbearing or harassing
in nature," and did not "make any threats or draw a weapon."
Id. at 412-13.
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ing typically offered,' 59 it is less clear that it "strikes an appropriate
balance in marking the reach of Fourth Amendment protections"'
160
or is even a workable standard. The approach expands the proposi-
tion that "the moral and instinctive pressures [on citizens] to coop-
erate [with police officers] are in general sound and may be relied
on by the police"' 6 1 to include encounters between police and sus-
pects in which the cooperation sought by the police is the incrimina-
tion of the citizen herself. The validity and desirability of such an
expansion is questionable.'
62
Expanding the proposition that police officers should be per-
mitted to rely on the "moral and instinctive pressures to cooperate"
to include situations in which the officers are seeking self-incriminat-
ing cooperation fails to give adequate weight to the fifth amendment
implications of police-suspect encounters. The police have no au-
thority to gather evidence through a frisk or search, because reason-
able suspicion does not exist in many of these encounters. Instead,
the officers' aim is to have the suspect incriminate herself "volunta-
rily" by confessing, providing an explanation that heightens the
level of suspicion, or consenting to a search. Under present fifth
amendment principles, obtaining evidence in this manner does not
violate that amendment. The suspect is not in custody for purposes
of Miranda,163 and the evidence gained through a consent search is
not compelled and often is not testimonial. 164 Nevertheless, when
police approach a citizen in a manner that they know will make the
citizen feel restrained, they create a situation in which the citizen no
doubt feels the need to take some action to quell the suspicion
aroused in order to continue on his or her way. Frequently, the sus-
pect will consent to a search or otherwise provide incriminating evi-
dence. 165 It seems incorrect to say such conduct does not implicate
constitutional protections and therefore will not be subject to scru-
tiny by the courts.
Another possible alternative to the current approach is to focus
159 Id. at 417.
160 Id.
161 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § I 10.1 Comment at 258 (1975).
162 Professor LaFave cites the MODEL CODE as support for this expansion but ignores
the CODE'S recognition of the distinction between police-citizen encounters and police-
suspect encounters. See infra note 166.
163 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420 (1984); Dix, supra note 6, at 939-951.
164 Use of physical evidence acquired during a search does not implicate the fifth
amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
165 See Greenberg, supra note 17, at 75 (noting that initial non:seizure encounter with
citizen only has enforcement utility if agents eventually achieve a more extensive
intrusion).
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on the purpose of the encounter. If the officer approaches the indi-
vidual to investigate that individual's involvement in criminal activ-
ity, the encounter would be deemed a seizure from the start. Such a
test has gained little support. However, the MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE does recognize the distinction between
police-citizen encounters and police-suspect encounters.' 66 It in-
cludes special provisions for questioning suspects as opposed to
seeking cooperation from citizens and requires warnings to suspects
that no legal obligation exists to respond to questioning. 6
7
Although courts understandably may be reluctant to require warn-
ings outside the Miranda context, 68 a seizure test that focuses on
the purposes of the police in initiating encounters with citizens can
provide some protection to citizens in police-citizen encounters in
which the police are seeking incriminating evidence from the citizen.
Such a standard has been adopted in California. 69 This standard
provides needed protection in an area not presently scrutinized
under the Mendelhall-Royer test, is more workable, and leads to more
consistent results than that test.
In In re Tony C.,170 the California Supreme Court held that
fourth amendment rights are implicated whenever an individual is
166 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 110.1(1)-(2). Subsection (1)
provides that officers "may, subject to the provisions of this Code... request any person
to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of
crime" without informing the individual of their right to refuse to cooperate. Subsec-
tion (2), however, requires that if an "officer, acting pursuant to this Section, suspects or
has reasonable cause to suspect that a person may have committed a crime, he shall...
take such steps as are reasonable under the circumstances to make clear that no legal
obligation exists to respond to the questioning." The commentary to Section 110.1
explains this distinction. The commentary points out that while the explicit authoriza-
tion to the police to seek cooperation is a recognition that "the moral and instinctive
pressures to cooperate are in general sound and may be relied on by the police," restric-
tions are nevertheless appropriate where "police conduct ... conflicts with particular
rights-such as the privilege against self-incrimination." Thus, subsection (2) places re-
strictions on an officer's ability to seek cooperation from a suspect. BothJustice Stewart
in Mendenhall and Professor LaFave cite the MODEL CODE and Commentary to support
applying the "non-seizure" category to instances of officers approaching suspects. This
seems misleading in light of the Code's explicit limitation on such conduct in Section
110.1(2).
167 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.1(2).
168 See Dix, supra note 7, at 928 (discussing applicability of Miranda to brief en-
counters); Greenberg, supra note 135, at 76 (suggesting warnings as alternative test for
seizure determination); Williamson, supra note 12, at 801 (explaining Miranda not appli-
cable but warning of freedom to leave not inconsistent with Miranda and could bejusti-
fied by need to clarify encounters). Some courts find the absence of warnings crucial in
making the seizure determination, and some police officers apparently now provide ap-
propriate warnings as a routine matter. See Pastor v. State, 498 So. 2d 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); State v. Hoffpauir, 44 Wash. App. 195, 722 P.2d 113 (1986).
169 See In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
170.1d.
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stopped or detained because the officer suspects the individual may
be personally involved in some criminal activity, but not when the
officer acts for other proper reasons.' 7 ' Professor LaFave criticizes
this test as being "certainly [in] error to the extent that it would
remove the protections of the fourth amendment from those who do
not happen to be suspected of criminal activity."' 172 Even if such a
result is intended by the Tony C. decision, it is not the necessary
result of using such a standard. That the Tony C. test is by definition
limited to encounters with those suspected of criminal activity does
not mean that citizens involved in other types of police encounters
are without fourth amendment protection. Rather, it simply means
the line may be drawn at a different point in those encounters.
When a police officer approaches a citizen and asks questions as part
of the officer's "community caretaking function," to seek the citi-
zen's cooperation, or for reasons other than suspicion that the citi-
zen is involved in a crime, the fourth amendment will not be
implicated until a seizure occurs as defined by either the Mendenhall-
Royer standard or some other standard based on what actions are
appropriate in such a situation.' 73 However, if the officer suspects
the individual approached of involvement in criminal activity, the
fourth amendment will be implicated immediately. Such a two-test
scenario is both practical and logical.
1 74
The two-test scenario is practical in part because the issue of
171 Id. at 893, 582 P.2d at 961, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
172 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 415.
173 For instance, in Florida v. Rawlings, 391 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the
police received a report of a shooting outside a home and encountered two individuals
when they arrived at the scene. Simply approaching those individuals would not be a
seizure because the officers have no reason to believe those individuals are involved in
the crime. However, the individuals are not without fourth amendment protections.
Certainly if the officers detain them by ordering them to remain or drawing their weap-
ons, or if they frisk the individuals, fourth amendment activity has occurred requiring
objective justification. Courts may also develop standards under which a seizure occurs
at an earlier point, when the officers develop suspicions that the individual is the perpe-
trator of the crime, or perhaps, only if those suspicions are communicated to the individ-
ual. In any event, simply using the purpose of the stop test suggested by Tony C. for
encounters with suspects does not necessarily require stripping non-suspects of all
fourth amendment protection as Professor LaFave suggests. See also People v. Epperson,
187 Cal. App. 3d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986)(applying Mendenhall-Royer test to en-
counter with non-suspect); State v. Goetaski, 39 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2165 (N.J. Super.
Ct. April 18, 1986)(recognizing that "so-called 'benign' stops" require different analy-
sis); State v. Chisholm, 39 Wash. App. 864, 696 P.2d 41 (1985)(suggesting that stops
made for noncriminal, non-investigatory purposes should be analyzed under different
standard than stops for criminal investigation purposes).
174 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 802 ("The perception [of restricted liberty] is
much more likely to arise when conduct of police is linked to investigation of specific
criminal activity."). See also supra note 173.
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whether a police-citizen encounter with a nonsuspect constitutes a
seizure will not arise frequently. As Professor LaFave points out, if
the person stopped is merely a potential witness, it is unlikely that
the person "will have the occasion or desire to challenge this action
unless something incriminating that person occurs as a consequence
of the stop.' 75 Of course, there is some danger that the police will
attempt to use the "community caretaking function" as a pretext for
the stop of a suspect to take advantage of the more relaxed seizure
standard for such encounters.' 76 Courts will have to be somewhat
vigilant in this area,177 and there may be some difficult cases. How-
ever, given the simplicity of the inquiry-whether the person was
approached because they were suspected of criminal activity or for
some other legitimate reason-the issue should be much less diffi-
cult than the current determination of whether a seizure has oc-
curred. In most of the difficult seizure cases to date, the purpose for
which the officers approached the individuals was apparent: 78 to
investigate the individual's involvement in criminal activity.
The distinction between the two types of cases is also logical. A
test based on the purpose of the police in initiating an encounter
recognizes the wholly different character of police-suspect en-
counters, resulting in large part from the self-incrimination implica-
tions of those encounters. 79 Moreover, it provides more consistent
results and strikes a more appropriate balance between fourth
amendment protections and the need to fight crime. 80
V. THE "PURPOSE OF THE STOP" TEST
The starting point for the present notion of a category of po-
lice-citizen encounters not amounting to a seizure is Chief Justice
Warren's observation in Terry that "[o]bviously not all personal in-
tercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of per-
175 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 353.
176 See United States v. Thompson, 33 Grim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2479 (11th Cir. August
22, 1983)(officer approached vehicle to warn driver to expect large parking lot charge);
United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704 (D. Conn. 1979), aft'd, 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.
1979) (officer stopped vehicle because he believed driver was lost); State v. Chisholm, 39
Wash. App. 864, 696 P.2d 41 (1985)(officer testifies that he stopped truck to inform
occupant that hat in bed of pick-up might blow out).
177 See Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17
U. MICH.J.L. REF. 523 (1984) [hereinafter Burkoff, "Pretext Search Doctrine"]; Burkoff,
"Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 (1982).
178 In virtually all the airport stop cases there was no question but that officers ap-
proached the individuals because they suspected them of criminal activity-transporting
narcotics.
179 See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
180 See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
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sons." 18 1 ChiefJustice Warren further observed:
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly
rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of
pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations
of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life .... En-
counters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes,
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for
crime. 1
8 2
Unfortunately, in creating the Mendenhall-Royer test, the Supreme
Court ignored the wide variety of purposes for which encounters are
initiated by police. Instead, the Court distinguished the encounters
solely on the basis of whether a reasonable person would feel free to
end the encounter. Thus, the Court treated identically individuals
whom police approach for the purpose of discovering whether that
individual is involved in criminal activity and individuals to whom
police desire to speak for other, innocuous reasons.1 8 3 The Court
simply ignored the fifth amendment implications of police activity
for the former purpose. As a result, police officers are permitted to
approach citizens without any objective justification and, by using
the inherent coerciveness of their authority, convince them that they
are not free to leave and that the best course is to incriminate them-
selves by confessing or consenting to a search, provided the officers
do not act in a fashion that triggers the reasonable person test.
In part, the willingness of the Court to permit officers to take
advantage of the inherent coerciveness of their authority in these
"nonseizure" scenarios is a manifestation of the increased value the
present Court places on confessions, and the increased recognition
it gives to the desirability of citizen cooperation with police of-
ficers. 18 4 The flaw in this elevation of citizen cooperation is the fail-
181 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. Justice White also observed in his concurrence
in Terry that "there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from ad-
dressing questions to anyone on the streets." Id. at 34. Justice Harlan, in his concur-
rence, likewise observed that police officers have "the liberty, (again possessed by every
citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has
an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away." Id. at 32-33.
182 Id. at 13.
183 The court in In re Tony C. observed:
Such reasons are obviously too many and too varied to recite, but they may be
grouped in at least two general categories: (1) the officer may wish to question the
person not as a suspect but merely as a witness to a crime, or (2) the officer may be
engaged in one of "those innumerable miscellaneous tasks which society calls upon
the police to do which have nothing to do with detection of crime" . . . such as
giving aid to persons in distress, mediating domestic quarrels, assisting the elderly
or disabled, furnishing traffic advice or directions, and generally preserving the
peace and protecting persons from harm or annoyance.
21 Cal. 3d at 895, 582 P.2d at 961, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
184 In Miranda, although recognizing the obligation of citzens to cooperate with po-
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ure to distinguish between the citizen's duty to cooperate with
police in their attempts to serve and protect the community and ap-
prehend other individuals suspected of criminal activity and the citi-
zen's duty to cooperate in implicating themselves in criminal
activity. 185 There is no duty in the latter case.'
8 6
Historically, courts have differentiated police attempts to solicit
cooperation from criminal suspects. Such different treatment is
mandated by the fifth amendment and was central to the Miranda
decision. Although Miranda limited its specific protection to custo-
dial interrogations of suspects, it does not necessarily follow that all
other situations should be categorized as having no fifth amendment
implications. While the specific protections of Miranda are not re-
quired in other settings, other protections may be appropriate in
light of remaining fifth amendment concerns. 187 Article 110 of the
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE distinguishes be-
tween "Requests for Cooperation" and "Questioning of Suspects"
on that basis,' 88 drawing support from the UNIFORM CODE OF MILI-
TARY JUSTICE and the ENGLISH JUDGES RULES.
1 8 9
Although full recognition of the fifth amendment implications
lice, the Court ruled that, in the absence of warnings, even voluntary confessions by
citizens should be excluded if they resulted from custodial interrogation. In large part
this was due to the perceived dangers of relying on such evidence. More recently, the
Court's view of the value of confessions has changed dramatically. See Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412 (1986)(admissions of guilt are essential to society's compelling interest in
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law); Van Kesell, "The Suspect
as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Ap-
proaches," 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1-6 (1986). This shift in emphasis clearly has an impact
on the Court's treatment of even noncustodial cooperation.
185 It is important that the Court's statement in Miranda that "[ilt is an act of responsi-
ble citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law
enforcement," followed immediately the Court's assurances that "[g]eneral on-the-
scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citi-
zens ... is not affected by our holding." 384 U.S. at 477. Moreover, this language has
been cited by the Court to support cooperation of third-parties with the police. See
Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973). See also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443,488 (197 1)(referring to cooperation of third-party, Court stated that
"it is no part of the policy underlying the [flourth and [f]ourteenth amendments to dis-
courage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals.").
186 Dix, supra note 6, at 939 (it seems reasonably clear that the federal fifth amend-
ment privileges apply to inquiries by law enforcement officers in the context of question-
ing non-arrest detainees).
187 See id. at 937-51 (discussing applicability of fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination and Miranda in nonarrest detentions); Williamson, supra note 12, at 797-802
(same).
188 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 110.1 Comment at p. 258.
189 Id. at 260. For a discussion of the history of the ENGLISH JUDGES' RULES and a
comparison of American and English treatment of the questioning of suspects, see gen-
erally Van Kessel, supra note 184.
1988] 473
EDWINJ. BUTTERFOSS
of these encounters suggests the need for warnings, 190 this is a step
the Supreme Court is certainly unwilling to take, and state courts
may be similarly hesitant. Requiring a series of different warnings
for different situations may ask too much of law enforcement offi-
cials and place added pressure on the exclusionary rule. On the
other hand, completely foregoing scrutiny of these encounters-the
result in many cases under the Mendenhall-Royer test-swings the
pendulum too far in the other direction.
Adoption of a seizure standard that focuses on the purpose for
which police initiate the encounter provides an alternative means to
accomplish needed judicial scrutiny of these encounters.19 ' Quite
simply, whenever a police officer initiates an encounter with a citizen
because the officer suspects the citizen may be personally involved
in criminal activity, the fourth amendment rights of that citizen are
implicated and the officer's actions require objective justification-
reasonable suspicion. Conversely, if the officer initiates the encoun-
ter for some other purpose, because the citizen is a witness, or as
part of "those innumerable miscellaneous tasks which society calls
upon the police to do which have nothing to do with the detection
of crime,"1 92 the contact itself will not trigger fourth amendment
protections, although additional acts by the officer may.' 93 Such a
standard recognizes the important distinction between the different
types of police-citizen encounters, more properly balances the com-
peting interests of the individual and the state, and provides a more
workable standard.
This distinction seems to be at the heart of the analysis offered
by the late Judge Swygert of the Seventh Circuit in a series of
seizure cases. In United States v. Berryman,194 police approached a
drug courier suspect at Logan Airport, questioned him, and eventu-
ally obtained his consent to search his suitcase and a package inside
the suitcase. When the officers found cocaine, they arrested the de-
190 Warnings are required by the MODEL CODE, the ENGLISH JUDGES RULES, and the
MILITARY CODE OF JUSTICE. See also Dix, supra note 6, at 951 (advocating some type of
warnings although not identical to Miranda warnings); Greenberg, supra note 17, at 76
(suggesting need for warnings in those encounters); Williamson, supra note 12, at 801
(recognizing Miranda not applicable but warnings not inconsistent with that decision and
could be justified by need to clarify encounters).
191 Another method of increasing judicial scrutiny of police-citizen encounters is to
increase the number of different "levels" of encounters and make more levels subject to
fourth amendment scrutiny. See People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976); LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 420-22 (discussing
DeBour).
192 In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d at 895, 582 P.2d at 961, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
193 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
194 717 F.2d 651, rev'd, 717 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1983)(en banc).
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fendant. Judge Swygert, writing the majority panel opinion, con-
cluded that a seizure had occurred during the questioning of the
defendant. Judge Swygert noted that in his view the seizure deter-
mination should not be made in a vacuum, limited to the physical
circumstances of the encounter and independent of the reason for
the officers' approach, because doing so provided the police with
virtually unfettered discretion in making arbitrary and discrimina-
tory stops. 195
Judge Swygert carefully noted that such an analysis was not in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that "not all per-
sonal intercourse between citizens and police officers involves
seizures of the persons." 196 He pointed out that asking for direc-
tions, questioning potential witnesses, and similar activities by the
police will likely invoke no fourth amendment concerns. The reason
for this, Judge Swygert reasoned:
is not that "law does not concern itself with trifles;" it is because these
situations, unlike inherently confrontational ones, do not pose any risk
of arbitrary or abusive exercise of discretion. But whenever an officer
identifies himself as a drug enforcement agent and singles out an indi-
vidual for questioning, the implication of suspicion and the potential
for abuse are clear. 1
97
Thus, in such situations a seizure has occurred. Finally, Judge
Swygert was careful to explain that this does not mean that in such
situations the police action may not be justified by an appropriate
level of suspicion, or that the level of suspicion must be the same as
that necessary for other types of seizures. That would represent a
strict categorization of police conduct into a single discreet cate-
gory, an approach rejected by the Supreme Court in Terry. Instead,
the interests involved must be balanced. But when the police have,
or at least offer, no individualized suspicion, the government's main
interest, in fact, is in avoiding arbitrariness.19 8
Although Berryntan was reversed' 99 and citation can be made to
cases rejecting "per se condemnation of voluntary suspect question-
ing," 200 Judge Swygert's analysis seems to be consistent with those
cases that advance the seizure determination to a point early in the
police-citizen encounter. Those courts seem unwilling to character-
195 Id. at 658.
196 Id. at 659.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1983)(en banc).
200 See id. at 661 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (later adopted as en banc opinion)(citing
United States v. Moya, 704 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Collis, 699 F.2d
832 (6th Cir. 1983)).
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ize the encounter as "innocent" at the point when the confronta-
tional aspects become clear and to treat the encounter the same as
any other encounter. They appear to recognize that more than
physical circumstances make up the seizure determination, although
their "watershed points" are physical circumstances. 20 1
As Judge Swygert explains, recognizing the fifth amendment or
confrontational implications of police-citizen encounters provides
protection against arbitrary stops. Although the Supreme Court has
expressed concern over the such stops, 20 2 the Mendenhall-Royer stan-
dard actually encourages arbitrariness.203 Under Mendenhall-Royer,
provided that the officer is sufficiently polite and non-threatening,
the officer need not provide objective justification for his or her ac-
tions in contacting a citizen. 20 4 Given the inherent coerciveness of
the officer's authority, exploitation of which is deemed sound under
Mendenhall-Royer, these stops without objective justification are fre-
quently successful. 20 5 One commentator has suggested an addi-
tional level of scrutiny beyond Mendenhall-Royer to protect against
arbitrary stops. 20 6 Requiring objective justification for a larger cate-
gory of police-citizen encounters is another way to provide protec-
tion against the arbitrary exercise of police authority.
A standard focusing on the purpose of the police-citizen en-
counter also avoids vastly different results in cases with similar
facts-a concern of the Terry court itself.20 7 Additionally, it should
be easy to determine whether an officer approached a citizen in or-
der to investigate that citizen's involvement in criminal activity, thus
providing consistency in the decisions as to which encounters con-
stitute seizures. This is so primarily because if the officer asserts
201 See supra notes 124-30.
202 See Greenberg, supra note 17, at 52 n.20; I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
203 Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)(no reasonable suspicion justifying encoun-
ter; upheld as "non-seizure" by state court on remand); United States v. Moore, 675
F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1982)( no reasonable suspicion at time of stop, but non-seizure until
probable cause developed); State v. Crespo-Aranguren, 42 Wash. App. 452, 711 P.2d
1096 (1985) (although unnecessary to decision in light of finding no seizure, court points
out unlikely sufficient justification for stop).
204 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 801 (difficult to understand why social amenities
should govern fourth amendment protections).
205 See supra note 203. For a discussion of the prevalence of police use and abuse of
the "non-seizure" category of police citizen encounters, see Burkoff, "Non-investigatory
Police Encounters," 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 681 (1978); Reich, "Police Questioning
of Law Abiding Citizens," 75 Yale 1161 (1966).
206 See Murphy, "Encounters of a Brief Kind: On Arbitrariness and Police Demands
for Identification," 1986 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 207, 226 (1986).
207 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19; Note, "Reformulating Seizures," supra note 17, at
1495-96. Most obviously, such a standard will eliminate the current disparity in treat-
ment between automobile stops and pedestrian stops.
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that investigating the individual for involvement in criminal activity
was not the officer's motivation, the officer will be required to pro-
vide an alternative explanation. 208 Although this may raise the issue
of pretextual bases for approaching a suspect, such pretexts should
not be difficult to identify. Reasons for contact with a citizen that
would not trigger fourth amendment protections are very unlike a
criminal investigation, and objective evidence of the existence of
reasons for a non-investigatory stop should be available.
20 9
Of course, courts will still have to make the decision whether
reasonable suspicion justifying a particular seizure was present.
This determination creates the possibility of divergent results under
similar factual settings. However, this is true even under the Men-
denhall-Royer standard when a court finds a seizure.210 At least a
more easily applied seizure test eliminates one pitfall in analyzing
the legal effect of police contacts with citizens. Moreover, the exist-
ence of reasonable suspicion is easier to determine than whether a
reasonable person would feel free to leave because it depends only
on the actions of the suspect. The Mendenhall-Royer test requires
courts to balance a variety of factors that focus on the behavior of
both the suspect and the officer: whether the suspect was walking or
sitting; whether the suspect expressed a desire to leave; whether
identification was requested and how quickly it was returned;
whether the suspect was moved to a different location and how far
away it was; the tone of voice used by the officer; and the extent to
which any mannerisms of the officer indicated a show of force.
211
A standard based on the purpose of the contact also provides
better guidance to the officer in the field. 212 The Mendenhall-Royer
standard provides incentives to intercede at an early point and not
to think carefully about the decision to do so because no objective
208 See In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d at 896 n.3, 582 P.2d at 961 n.3, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370
n.3.
209 Of course, the issue of police manipulation of facts to create such reasons is a
possibility. However, the possibility of police manipulation of facts is present regardless
of the test used. It is not, as Professor LaFave suggests, unique to a test based on the
subjective intentions of the officer. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
210 In fact, to the extent courts characterize the encounters as non-seizures and de-
cline to make the reasonable suspicion determination, development of precedent re-
garding what constitutes reasonable suspicion will be frustrated.
211 See supra Section IIIB. See also Williamson, supra note 12, at 792-802.
212 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 12, at 407 ("[A]ny test intended to
determine what street encounters are not seizures must be expressed in terms that can
be understood and applied by the officer."). The Supreme Court also has recognized
this as an important consideration. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 43 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA)
3077, 3079 (U.S. S. Ct. June 13, 1988)(objective test allows officer to determine in ad-
vance whether his or her conduct will constitute a seizure).
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justification is required if the officer can avoid conduct that consti-
tutes a seizure. However, this increases the possibility of a misstep
by the officer resulting in the loss of evidence. If the officer's man-
nerisms unknowingly create a show of authority2 13 or if the officer
retains the citizen's identification too long, the encounter could be
classified as a seizure and, because the officer interceded at an early
point, reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure will not be present.
Under the proposed standard, because the officer knows the pur-
pose of the contact, he or she will also know objective justification is
required and will refrain from acting until such justification is pres-
ent.2 14 The danger of a misstep by the officer that converts the con-
tact into a seizure is substantial under the Mendenhall-Royer test due
to the artificiality of that test. Because the decision as to whether a
reasonable person would feel free to leave bears little relationship
to whether the average citizen in fact would feel free to leave, knowl-
edge of court precedents rather than common sense must guide the
officers.
Finally, a standard based on the purpose of the contact elimi-
nates the fiction now used to determine the fourth amendment
rights of citizens. 21 5 The result is more consistent treatment of citi-
zens. Under such a standard, all individuals with whom police of-
ficers initiate an encounter for the purpose of investigating that
individual's involvement in criminal activity will be required to sub-
mit to the intrusion because their actions have provided the police
with objectively justifiable reasons to so intrude. Individuals will no
longer be required to submit simply because police had a "hunch"
and the court was willing to let them exploit the inherent coercive-
ness of their authority.
There are, of course, reasons why a court may be unwilling to
adopt such a test. To some extent, it may be reminiscent of the
focus test, whereby certain protections were obtained by a suspect
when police developed a certain level of suspicion about that sus-
pect.216 That test was discarded, in part, because of obvious line
213 Perhaps by force of habit the officer places his or her hand on a service revolver, a
fact some courts seem willing to consider important.
214 This does not mean the officer must simply refrain from acting entirely and let the
suspect go free. The officer can continue surveillance or take other steps not implicating
the fourth amendment in order to develop reasonable suspicion that would justify a
stop.
215 See Burkoff, "Pretext Search Doctrine," supra note 177, at 549 ("Not only is fourth
amendment doctrine threatened, the whole fabric of law is threatened, when the law
permits-even encourages-the state to legitimize its otherwise unconstitutional acqui-
sition of evidence on the basis of a lie.").
216 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1974).
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drawing difficulties.2 1 7 But the proposed test for defining a seizure
does not share those drawbacks. Unlike the focus test, difficult de-
terminations as to the precise level of suspicion that the individual is
involved in criminal activity are unnecessary. Rather, constitutional
protections are triggered at a single, clearly delineated point: when
police initiate contact with a person to discuss his or her involve-
ment in criminal activity. A court may also hesitate to adopt the
proposed test because it actually believes the fiction of the Menden-
hall-Royer test-that in many police-citizen encounters, a reasonable
person would feel free to leave. Such a belief seems unlikely, how-
ever, in light of the nearly unanimous agreement to the contrary,
even by proponents of the test.2
18
Courts may also believe that a per se rule deprives police of
needed flexibility in dealing with the myriad situations represented
by police-citizen encounters. 219 However, if the focus is limited to
encounters initiated to investigate the individual's involvement in
criminal activity, 220 the Terry standard itself provides the necessary
flexibility. Only reasonable suspicion is required to initiate these
encounters. It is not at all obvious why a police officer requires the
flexibility to question individuals the officer believes may be in-
volved in criminal activity when the officer's suspicion is below the
level of reasonable suspicion.22 1 Being faithful to the fourth amend-
ment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures re-
quires denying police officers the flexibility to interfere with a
citizen's right to be left alone in the absence of objective justifica-
tion, or reasonable suspicion, for such interference. 222 The true
need for flexibility is not in making the stop, but in dealing with
possible developments following the initial approach. Present inter-
pretations of the scope of permissible police conduct in the course
of executing investigative detentions provide this flexibility.
Of course, courts may be unwilling to recognize the "evil" in
officers requesting "cooperation" from citizens simply because
those citizens happen to be suspected of criminal activity, may be
217 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Beckwith v. United States, 425
U.S. 341 (1976).
218 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
219 United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 651, 661 (1st Cir. 1983)(Breyer, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 717 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1983)(en banc) (adopting reasoning of dissenting opin-
ion of panel).
220 See supra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
221 See Burkoff, "Non Investigatory Police Encounters," supra note 205, at 703-14
("[T]he value of ["non-investigatory encounters] has been greatly overestimated, and
the harms ... greatly underestimated.").
222 Berryman, 717 F.2d at 659.
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unwilling to discard years of precedent despite its lack of clarity, and
may be reluctant to make what is perceived to be a change in a semi-
nal case such as Terry. At least a partial answer is that it is the Men-
denhall-Royer test that is not true to the Court's opinion in Terry.
2 23
The line for what constituted a seizure drawn by the Court in Terry
was that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and re-
strains his freedom to walk away, he has seized' that person." 224
Moreover, the Terry Court recognized that the restraint could be ac-
complished not only by physical force but also by a show of author-
ity.2 25 In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart converted the detention test of
Terry to the "reasonable person" test. That an individual can in fact
be restrained-accosted by an officer who has no intention of letting
them leave-but not seized for fourth amendment purposes demon-
strates that the Mendenhall-Royer test is underinclusive as a trigger
for fourth amendment protections.
Even if the proposed test is viewed as overinclusive in that it
will classify as seizures cases in which an officer approaches an indi-
vidual to investigate that individual's involvement in criminal activ-
ity but would let the individual decline and walk away, and the
individual truly feels free to do so, the test is justified by the experi-
ence with Mendenhall-Royer.226 Of course, a bright line rule drawn in
223 See Greenberg, supra note 17, at 68; Note, "Reformulating Seizures" supra note 17,
at 1496.
224 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
225 Id. at 19 n.16.
226 As Professor LaFave has stated:
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is pri-
marily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought
to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of
the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly so-
phisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the
drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff
upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be
"literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."
If the rules are impossible of application by the police, the result may be the
sustaining of motions to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds with some regu-
larity, but this can hardly be taken as proof that "the people" are "secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Rather, that security can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination before-
hand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforce-
ment. In short, "the understandable temptation to be responsive to every relevant
shading of every relevant variation of every relevant complexity" must be resisted
or else the result may be "a fourth amendment with all of the character and consis-
tency of a Rorschach blot."
LaFave, " 'Case by Case Adjudication' Versus 'Standardized Procedures': The Robin-
son Dilemma," 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141-42 (1974).
The cases discussed in Section IIIB supra demonstrate that the difficulty in applying
the Mendenhall-Royer test has resulted in a fourth amendment with all the character and
consistency of a Rorschach blot on the issue of when an officer has seized a citizen.
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favor of suspects risks being labeled a prophylactic rule and being
criticized as not being a true gauge of when unconstitutional behav-
ior has occurred. In Professor LaFave's terminology, 227 it arguably
is like telling the police they cannot go beyond mile seven, but plac-
ing the seven mile signpost at mile six to make sure the police do
not exceed the true seven mile mark.
In the case of the "purpose of the stop" test suggested here,
however, this situation does not exist. Rather, the bright line rule is
an attempt to place the seven mile signpost precisely at mile seven.
At present, that signpost is at mile eight. Police are told they cannot
"seize" an individual without reasonable suspicion, but the standard
for when a seizure occurs-when a reasonable person would not feel
free to walk away-is applied in an artificial fashion that permits
police to go beyond the point at which a reasonable person in fact
would no longer feel free to walk away. In virtually every case, that
point is when the officer approaches the individual and initiates the
encounter. Thus, the purpose of the stop test more accurately iden-
tifies when a seizure has occurred. The test is much less overinclu-
sive than Mendenhall-Royer is underinclusive and, thus, errs on the
side of providing protection for citizens' rights. Moreover, although
some may argue that the proposed test is overinclusive and fails to
strike the appropriate balance between the interests of the citizens
and the state, it must be remembered that police encounters with
suspects are not being eliminated or found per se unlawful under
the proposed standard. Rather, all that is required is objective justi-
fication for the intrusion on a citizen's liberty.
VI. CONCLUSION
At a time when legal fictions are viewed skeptically, it is curious
that one of the most cherished rights of citizens is being determined
by a legal fiction. Hopefully, as state courts increasingly provide
greater protections for their citizens than that provided by the
United States Supreme Court,228 those courts will look carefully at
However, the Supreme Court seems not to appreciate this. See Michigan v. Chesternut,
43 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 3077, 3079 (U.S. S. Ct. June 13, 1988)(objective Mendenhall-
Royer test allows officers to determine in advance whether their conduct will constitute a
seizure).
227 LaFave, "The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 'Bright'
Lines' and 'Good Faith,'" 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307, 359-60 (1982). ,
228 Collins, "Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From A Reactionary Approach,"
9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1 (1981); Collins, Galie, & Kincaid, "State High Courts, State
Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: AJudicial Survey," 13 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1987); Kelman, "Rediscovering the State Constitutions' Bill of
Rights," 27 WAYNE L. REv. 413 (1981); Linde, "First Things First: Rediscovering the
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how the liberty rights of their citizens are being decided and discard
the fiction of the Mendenhall-Royer test in favor of a test which more
realistically determines the seizure question. 229 In Adamson v. Cali-
fornia,230 Justice Frankfurter noted that "decisions of this Court do
not have equal intrinsic authority."'23 1 In light of the lack of analysis
involved in adopting the Mendenhall-Royer test, and the inconsistent
results of lower courts applying the test, it should be clear that the
intrinsic value of Mendenhall and Royer is not great, and state courts
should be willing to analyze for themselves the appropriate test for
determining when their citizens are entitled to constitutional protec-
tion during encounters with police officers.
States' Bill of Rights," 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Pollock, "The State Constitutions
as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights," 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983); Sedler,
"The State Constitutions and the Supplemental Protection of Individual Rights," 16
TOLEDO L. REV. 465 (1985); Williams, "State Constitutional Law Processes," 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 669 (1983).
229 See Dix, supra note 6, at 870 (expressing the view that the development of a consis-
tent and independent approach to the seizure determination by state courts is unlikely
due to the "widespread assumption that Supreme Court approaches are presumptively
appropriate.").
230 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
231 Id. at 59.
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